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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5662
This paper develops an innovative 21 sector computable 
general equilibrium model of Armenia to assess the 
impact on Armenia of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, as 
well as further regional or multilateral trade policy 
commitments. The analysis finds that such an agreement 
with the European Union will likely result in substantial 
gains to Armenia, but shows that the gains derive 
from the deep aspects of the agreement. In order of 
importance, the sources of the gains are: (i) trade 
facilitation and reduction in border costs; (ii) services 
liberalization; and (iii) standards harmonization. A 
This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at dtarr@worldbank.org.  
shallow agreement with the European Union that focuses 
only on preferential tariff liberalization in goods will 
likely lead to small losses to Armenia primarily due to 
a loss of productivity from lost varieties of technologies 
from the rest of the world region in manufactured 
products. Additional gains can be expected in the long 
run from an improvement in the investment climate. 
The authors estimate only small gains from a services 
agreement with countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, but significant gains from expanding 
services liberalization multilaterally.1 
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Armenia, along with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, is one of four countries to the east 
of the European Union (EU) that has been targeted by the EU for negotiation of a ―Deep and 
Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Agreement‖  (DCFTA).  Based  on  the  EU-Ukraine  ongoing 
negotiation,  we  know  that  a  DCFTA  between  Armenia  and  the  EU  will  contain  numerous 
chapters and go well beyond tariff liberalization on goods. Notably, a DCFTA would include 
negotiation of liberalization of business services sectors, and the EU has traditionally placed 
considerable  emphasis  on  harmonization  of  standards  with  the  EU,  as  well  improved  trade 
facilitation and lower border costs. Evaluation of these deeper aspects of free trade agreements 
presents challenges for modelers.  
Since the early 1990s, regional trade agreements have surged; 283 are in force and have 
been notified to the WTO as of February 2010.
 1  Given the inclusion of services in modern FTA 
agreements negotiated with the EU, the US and in some other agreements, economists need to be 
able  to  assess  the  impact  of  services  commitments  as  part  of  their  advice  to  governments 
regarding preferential trade agreements.  Since both economic theory and empirical literature 
have  shown  that  wide  availability  of  business  services  results  in  productivity  gains  to  the 
                                                           
1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. This does not include a significant 
number that are in force but which have not been notified to the WTO.  3 
 
manufacturing sector and contributes to its international competitiveness.
2 Services commitments 
in regional agreements could lead to substantial productivity improvements. But is there an 
analogy to trade diversion in goods whereby preferential commitments in ser vices could be 
immizerising?   Moreover, regional agreements with the EU and the US are ―deep‖ involving 
elements  of  standards  harmonization  and  trade  facilitation,  among  other  chapters.  Are 
developing countries likely to obtain substantially larger gains from a deep agreement with a 
developed country, rather than a free trade agreement with a developing country?  How do the 
gains of preferential versus global liberalization compare?  
Armenia  is  an  example  of  a  country  facing  regional  trade  policy  choices  with  both 
developed and developing countries, as well as multilateral trade policy choices. In addition to 
being a candidate for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the 
European Union, it has existing free trade agreements with the countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Moreover, in the context of its international negotiations under the 
                                                           
2 Arnold et al. (2007), Fernandes (2007) and Fernandes and Paunov (2008) have provided 
econometric estimates of the gains from services liberalization.  Marshall (1988) shows that in 
three regions in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of 
the services purchased by manufacturers were bought from suppliers within the same region.   He 
cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the local availability of producer 
services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local availability of producer 
services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors. 
Both the urban economics literature (Vernon, 1960; Chinitz, 1961) and the modern economic 
geography literature (e.g., Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) have focused on 
the fact that related economic activity is economically concentrated due to agglomeration 
externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, Italy).  
Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms operating in 
economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Caballero 
and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in industries when output of its input supplying 
industries increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are 
clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor 
countries are spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained by 
transportation costs for inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that 
are far away for the countries where a large variety of such inputs are located. 4 
 
Doha Development Agenda, Armenia may be called upon to make further commitments in the 
business services area.  
Policy-makers  have  expressed  considerable  demand  for  analysis  of  their  actual  or 
potential  regional  agreements.  Applied  modelers  have  responded  with  applied  general 
equilibrium models that focus on goods. So the literature now contains a substantial number of 
good studies (summarized below) that examine regional agreements in goods. But except of 
Jensen  and  Tarr  (2010),  the  literature  does  not  contain  any  numerical  studies  of  regional 
arrangements that involve commitments to multinational firms who will undertake foreign direct 
investment in services. We attempt to fill that gap in this paper. Crucial to the analysis, we 
incorporate  the  Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier  mechanism  of  endogenous  productivity  gains  from 
additional varieties of imperfectly produced goods and services. Moreover, as a component of 
the DCFTA, we evaluate the impact on Armenia of establishing a national quality infrastructure 
that would facilitate Armenian firms that wish to export to the EU to comply with EU voluntary 
standards, technical regulations in goods and meet EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements. 
(We refer to this simply as standards harmonization in this paper, although this subject is broader 
than standards on manufactured goods.)  As we explain below, however, we do not recommend 
that Armenia adopt all EU SPS requirements as requirements for producing for the Armenia or 
CIS markets; rather a case by case approach would be advisable based on an evaluation of the 
costs versus benefits.  
In this paper we develop a 21 sector small open economy comparative static computable 
general equilibrium model of Armenia that we believe is appropriate to evaluate the impact of an 
EU-Armenian DCFTA along with other trade policy options of Armenia.  We build on the model 
of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2008) and Jensen and Tarr (2010), but we decompose the rest of 5 
 
the world into three regions: the European Union; our CIS region; and the Rest of the World. All 
foreign regions are sources of foreign direct investment in some of the business services sectors. 
In addition, and crucially for the results, we evaluate the impact of lowering standards and border 
costs as a result of the DCFTA with the EU. 
We find that a DCFTA with the EU will likely result in substantial gains to Armenia, but 
we  show  that  the  gains  derive  from  the  deep  aspects  of  the  agreement.  We  estimate  that  a 
shallow free trade agreement with the EU that focuses only on preferential tariff liberalization in 
goods will likely lead to small losses to Armenia due to traditional trade diversion (tariff losses 
on displaced imports from the Rest of the World region) and, more importantly, due to a loss of 
productivity  from  lost  varieties  of  technologies  form  the  Rest  of  the  World  region  in 
manufactured products.   We estimate that the gains to Armenia from a DCFTA with the EU 
derive  from  further  liberalization  of  barriers  in  services  (by  50  percent  of  the  ad  valorem 
equivalents), harmonization of standards
3 and most importantly, from a trade facilitation and a 
reduction  in  border  costs.    Additional  gains  can  be  e xpected  in  the  long  run  from  an 
improvement in the investment climate.  But we calculate slightly smaller gains if Armenians 
presently capture the rents from the barriers against foreign service-providers.  
Preferential liberalization of barriers against CIS services providers could add additional 
gains, but these gains would be very small.  The gains from further integration with the CIS are 
small for two reasons: first, institutional development through standards harmonization and trade 
facilitation are not considered part of the scenario, since it is not considered a likely outcome. 
Although we do consider deeper service commitments on a preferential basis in the CIS, 
                                                           
3 As we discuss in section III below, this does not imply that we recommend that Armenia adopt all technical 
regulations and sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements of the European Union.  6 
 
technology diffusion obtained through trade and FDI with transition and developing countries 
has been estimated to be much smaller than the technology diffusion obtained through trade and 
FDI with developed countries.  
We  find  that  unilateral  liberalization  of  services  and  trade  barriers  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis would yield gains that are about three times the gains from preferential 
liberalization of goods and services with the EU alone. This policy would assure that Armenia 
receives goods and services form the least cost supplier and would eliminate any trade diversion 
costs. Liberal rules of origin in any preferential agreement would help move Armenia toward 
achieving the gains from unilateral liberalization. Finally, we estimate that a reduction in non-
discriminatory regulatory barriers (that is, barriers that raise the costs of Armenians as well as 
foreign services providers in Armenia) would provide significant additional benefits in Armenia.  
We devote considerable attention to the sensitivity of our results to uncertainty in the 
parameters. First, to understand the model better, we conduct piecemeal sensitivity of the results, 
where  we  isolate  the  impact  of  each  of  the  parameters  to  ascertain  which  parameters  most 
strongly  impact  the  results.  Second,  to  assess  the  robustness  of  the  results  to  parameter 
uncertainty, we conduct systematic sensitivity  analysis, where we execute the model  30,000 
times. Each simulation is based on a random draw of all the parameter values; we then present 
sample distributions and sample confidence intervals of the key variables.  Finally, we conduct 
sensitivity on a range of values of key parameters that determine the productivity impacts in 
imperfect competition.  
An  earlier  estimate  of  the  gains  to  Armenia  from  the  DCFTA  is  Maliszewska  et  al. 
(2008),  known  as  the  CASE  study.  The  CASE  study  estimates  gains  to  Armenia  from  the 7 
 
DCFTA that are about 2.5 times larger than the gains estimated in the present study. We explain 
in appendix I that the larger estimated gains of the CASE study are due to due to a combination 
of two effects: (i) larger assumed distortions in the CASE study;  and (ii) different modeling 
assumptions. The larger the distortions are, the more gains there are from their removal.  As we 
explain in appendix I, the larger distortions in the CASE study partly reflect the fact that our 
study was based on estimates of distortions in 2010, while the CASE study uses estimates of 
distortions  from  2006  or  2007.  Since  Armenia  has  implemented  substantial  reforms  in  the 
interim, the initial distortions in the CASE study are significantly higher. This is the case with 
border costs. But it is also due, in some cases, to the fact that we had greater data available to us 
that allowed a more accurate estimate, for example in the services survey and estimates that we 
conducted.  Further,  we  assume  that  the  benefits  of  services  commitments  in  a  DCFTA  are 
limited to EU investors, while the CASE study assumes those commitments will be extended 
multilaterally.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide an overview of the estimation 
of the ad valorem equivalents of barriers in Armenian services sectors. We provide an overview 
of the model in section III and a discussion of the data in section IV. The central results are 
presented  in  section  V  and  sensitivity  results  are  presented  in  section  VI.  Conclusions  are 
presented in section VII. In appendix A, we discuss the trade and tariff data in some detail. We 
document the calculation of ownership shares by sector and region in appendix B. How we 
obtained estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities in goods is described in appendix C. Our 
estimation of the reduction in trade or border costs as a result of a DCFTA is presented in 
appendix D and our estimate of the reduction in standards costs is presented the section E. The 
estimates and methodology of the ad valorem equivalents of barriers in services is explained in 8 
 
Modebadze  and  Eroyants  (2010)  and  our  construction  of  a  balanced  input-output  table  for 
Armenia is explained in appendix G.  
II. Estimation of the Tariff Equivalence of the Regulatory Barriers in Services 
Estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of the regulatory barriers in services are crucial 
to  the  results.  In  order  to  make  these  estimates,  we  first  need  to  assess  the  regulatory 
environment in the services sectors in our model. We commissioned a 112 page survey of the 
regulatory regimes in key Armenian business services sectors, namely, insurance, banking, fixed 
line and mobile telecommunications services and air transportation services. We supplemented 
that information with research by regional experts into the relevant sector.
4 This questionnaire 
and  research  provided  us  with  data  and  descriptions  and  assessments  of  the  regulatory 
environment in these sectors.  
Modebadze (2010) then estimated the ad valorem equivalents of barriers to foreign direct 
investment in fixed line and mobile telecommunications, banking, insurance  and maritime 
transportation  services.  The  process  involved  converting  the  answers  and  data  of  the 
questionnaires  into  an  index  of  restrictiveness  in  each  industry.  Modebadze  followed  the 
methodology of Kimura, Ando and Fujii (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) to generate these estimates. The 
methodology involves classification of the possible restrictions into separate categories with 
unique weights summing to one, where the weights are determined based on the significance of 
each category. Next, Modebadze assigned a score to each potential restriction, where the score 
reflects the level of restriction imposed by the economy.  Modebadze estimated two indices: an 
index of ―regulatory barriers‖ (RB index) where the regulatory barriers impose costs on both 
domestic and multinational firms in a non-discriminatory manner; and an index of discriminatory 
barriers against multinational service providers, which we call the foreign discriminatory index 
(FDR index).
5   
This methodology further involves building on the estimates and methodology explained 
in the volume by C. Findlay and T. Warren (2000), notably papers by Warren (2000), McGuire 
                                                           
4 We thank Karine Eroyants and Grigol Modebadze for this research.  
5 In order to obtain the estimated score for each restriction, the assigned score is multiplied by the 
corresponding weight. Finally, the estimated scores for all categories are summed to obtain the 
restrictiveness indices. 9 
 
and Schulele (2000) and Kang (2000).  For each of these service sectors, the authors evaluated 
the regulatory environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against 
the regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of 
services. Modebadze then assumed that the international regression applies to Armenia in the 
case that the above mentioned restrictiveness indexes are used. Applying that regression and 
their assessments of the regulatory environment in Armenia from the questionnaires and other 
information sources, he estimated the ad valorem impact of a reduction in barriers
6 both for 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory barriers.  Modebadze then weighted his fixed line and 
mobile  telecommunications  estimates  by  their  market  shares  to  obtain  her  estim ate  for 
communications.  The results of the estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of the barriers are 
listed in table 4. Details are provided in Modebadze and Eroyants (2010). 
III. Overview of the Model 
 
This paper builds on the algebraic structure of the models of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2007; 2010). Here we provide a general description of the structure described there and provide 
more details where we depart from that structure. There are 21 sectors in the model shown in 
table 1. These include six imperfectly competitive business services sectors, two imperfectly 
competitive goods sectors and thirteen competitive goods and services sectors. Labor and capital 
are the two primary factors of production. In each imperfectly competitive sector there is sector-
specific capital that is unique to production from each region in the model; and there are primary 
inputs imported by multinational service providers, reflecting specialized management expertise 
or technology of the firm. The existence of sector specific capital in the imperfectly competitive 
sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile factors and 
supply curves in these sectors slope up.  In our central model, we assume that 50 percent of the 
capital in each of the imperfectly competitive sectors in sector specific. We conduct sensitivity 
analysis with respect to this share by allowing 25 percent and 75 percent of the capital in each 
sector to be sector specific. 
                                                           
6 Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price 
impacts. The estimates by Modebadze that we employ are for ―discriminatory‖ barriers against 
foreign direct investment.  10 
 
There are three categories of firms in the model: (1) perfectly competitive goods and 
services  sectors:  (2)  imperfectly  competitive  goods  sectors;  and  (3)  imperfectly  competitive 
services sectors with foreign direct investment. The cost, production and pricing structures in the 
three categories differ widely. As in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2010), we disaggregate the rest 
of the world region into three regions. In this case the three regions are: (1) the European Union; 
(2) the CIS; and (3) the Rest of the World. In the imperfectly competitive sectors, this requires 
introducing different firm types with distinct cost structures for each region. We retain the small 
open economy model framework, so only Armenia is modeled fully.  
Perfectly competitive goods and services sectors 
Regardless of sector, all firms minimize the cost of production. In the 13 competitive 
goods and services sectors, goods or services are produced under constant returns to scale and 
where price equals marginal costs with zero profits. In these sectors, products are differentiated 
by country of origin, i.e., we employ the Armington assumption. All goods producing firms 
(including imperfectly competitive firms) can sell on the domestic market or export.  Firms 
optimize their output decision between exports and domestic sales based on relative prices and 
their  constant  elasticity  of  transformation  production  function.  Having  chosen  how  much  to 
allocate between exports and domestic sales, firms also optimize their output decision between 
exports to the three possible export regions, based on relative prices the three regions and their 
constant elasticity of transformation production function for shifting output between the regions. 
Goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale 
We  have  two  goods  in  this  category  in  the  model:  mining  and  an  aggregate 
manufacturing sector. These goods are differentiated at the firm level. We assume that these 
goods may be produced domestically or imported for firms in any region in the model. Firms in 
these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals marginal revenue; 
and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero. For domestic firms, costs are defined by 
observed primary factor and intermediate inputs to that sector in the base year data. Foreigners 
produce  the  goods  abroad  at  constant  marginal  cost  but  incur  a  fixed  cost  of  operating  in 
Armenia. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price, and, by the 
zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price must cover fixed and marginal costs of 11 
 
foreign  firms.  Domestic  firms  set  prices  using  the  Chamberlinian  large  group  monopolistic 
competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups 
over marginal cost for both foreign firms and domestic firms. 
Unlike Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2007), but following Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2010) all imperfectly competitive domestic firms (both goods and services producers) face a 
downward sloping demand curve in each of their three export markets. Consistent with firm level 
product differentiation, we assume that the elasticity of demand in each of the export markets is 
the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of demand. Firms then set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs 
in each of the three export markets; then the export markets contribute to the quasi-rents of the 
firm and affect the entry and exit decisions of firms.  
Introducing  downward  sloping  demand  curves  into  the  model  means  that  there  are 
possible terms of trade affects to consider in this model that were not present in the Jensen, 
Rutherford and Tarr (2007) model. Balistreri and Markusen (2009) have shown, however, that 
there should be virtually no role for optimal tariffs to exploit terms of trade effects. The reason is 
that,  unlike  perfectly  competitive  firms,  imperfectly  competitive  firms  are  pricing  such  that 
marginal revenue equals marginal costs on export markets, which is the objective of optimal 
tariffs.    
For simplicity we assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in 
all  firms  producing  under  increasing  returns  to  scale  (in  both  goods  and  services).  This 
assumption in a Dixit-Stiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model assures that output per 
firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalization gains or 
losses.  
The number of varieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive 
goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of 




Service sectors that are produced under increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition 
These  sectors  are  telecommunications,  banking  services,  insurance  services,  air 
transportation services, railroad transportation services and pipeline transportation services. In 
these services sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign service-providers 
on a cross border basis analogous to goods providers from abroad. But a large share of business 
services are provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and 
Armenian.
7 Our model allows for both types of foreign provision  of services in these sectors. 
There are cross border services allowed in thi s sector and they are provided from abroad at 
constant costs—this is analogous to competitive provision of goods from abroad. Cross border 
services, however, are not good substitutes for service providers who have a domestic presence.
8 
Crucial to the resul ts, we allow multinational service firm providers that choose to 
establish a presence in  Armenia in order to compete with  Armenian firms directly.  As in the 
goods sectors, services that are produced subject to increasing returns to scale are differentiate d 
at the firm level. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) 
equals marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero.  We assume firm 
level  product  differentiation  and  employ  the  Chamberlinian   large  group  monopolistic 
competition  assumption  within  a  Dixit -Stiglitz  framework.  Given  our  assumption  on  the 
composition of fixed and variable costs, we have constant markups over marginal cost for both 
foreign firms and domestic firms, i.e., no rationalization impacts. 
 For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factors and intermediate 
inputs to that sector in the base year data.  When multinationals service providers decide to 
establish  a  domestic  presence  in  Armenia,  they  will  import  s ome  of  their  technology  or 
management expertise. That is, foreign direct investment generally entails importing specialized 
                                                           
7 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of 
trade  in  services  provided  by  multinational  affiliates  at  38%.  Travel  expenditures  20%  and 
compensation to employees working abroad 1% make up the difference. See Brown and Stern 
(2001, table 1).  
8 Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is 
provided at a distance. 13 
 
foreign  inputs.  Thus,  the  cost  structure  of  multinationals  differs  from  national  only  service 
providers.  Multinationals  incur  costs  related  to  both  imported  primary  inputs  and  Armenian 
primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of services differs 
from  foreign  provision  of  goods,  since  the  service  providers  use  Armenian  primary  inputs. 
Domestic  service  providers  do  not  import  the  specialized  primary  factors  available  to  the 
multinationals. Hence, domestic service firms incur primary factor costs related to Armenian 
labor and capital only.  These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. 
For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and 
entry. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment will induce foreign entry that 
will typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are 
available, buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-
Stiglitz variety effect). 
Trade facilitation and border costs 
According to the World Bank Logistics Performance Index of 2010, Armenia ranks 111
th 
in the world out of 155 countries.
9 This is an improvement from 131
st in the world in 2007,
10 but 
still leaves considerable room for improvement.  Given the focus of the EU on institutional 
development for trade facilitation, a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU is 
likely to reduce these costs for exports to the EU.  We therefore assume that the costs of 
exporting to the EU from Armenia will fall and the costs of importing into Armenia from the EU 
will also fall. Moreover, improved institutional development for trade facilitation is likely to 
reduce trade facilitation costs for imports from and exports to all regions. If customs is more 
efficient in processing imports from the EU, these procedures will generally facilitate trade with 
all regions. For example, if trucks with imports from the EU can pass through Armenian borders 
more quickly, trucks with imports from other countries are also likely to see reduced delays. 
Given that the EU will monitor trade with the EU much more carefully, it is possible that not all 
institutional reforms in trade facilitation will transmit to trade with non -EU countries. So we 
shall assume that the border costs of exporting to or importing from non -EU countries will fall 
by a smaller percentage. 
                                                           
9 See: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/tradesurvey/mode1b.asp. 
10 See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTLF/Resources/lpireport.pdf. 14 
 
To obtain quantitative estimates, we rely on a survey of Armenian firms undertaken for 
the study by Maliszewska et al., (2008) and data from the Cost of Doing Business study of the 
World Bank. We estimate that the costs of importing from and exporting to the EU will fall by 
2.5  percent  of  production  costs,  while  the  costs  of  importing  into  Armenia  from  non-EU 
countries  will  fall  by  2.3  percent  of  production  costs  and  the  cost  of  exporting  to  non-EU 
countries from Armenia will fall by 2.2 percent of production costs. Details of the estimation are 
available in appendix D. 
Standards costs 
The EU devoted considerable resources to assisting its new member states with standards 
and, similarly it is  allocating resources  to  this  problem for the countries  with  which it  may 
potentially have a DCFTA. Consequently, we assume these costs will fall as a result of a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. That is, for firms who will sell in the EU, after 
adaption by the firms and Armenian development of the National Quality  Infrastructure, we 
assume the production costs of selling in the EU by Armenian firms will decline. We rely on a 
survey  by  Jakubiak  et  al.,  (2006)  and  adapt  it  for  Armenia.  We  estimate  that  the  costs  of 
compliance with EU standards as a percentage of production costs will fall for Armenian exports 
to the EU of agricultural (manufacturing) products from 15.8 (21.6) percent of production to 11.8 
(16.2)  percent  of  production.  But  there  are  costs  of  facilities  to  meet  EU  standards  and  in 
development  of  the  National  Quality  Infrastructure  that  we  estimate  will  diminish  the  cost 
reduction by  about  2 percent.  Since the CIS market  is  predominantly regulated by  ―GOST‖ 
regulations,  we  do  not  assume  that  production  costs  for  Armenian  exporters  would  fall  on 
exports to any market other than the EU. Details are in Appendix E. 
An important policy caveat to the above paragraph is that we do not recommend that 
Armenia adopt all EU technical regulations and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures. On 
the one hand, facilitating but  not  compelling voluntary harmonization to  standards in  goods 
should be beneficial and is the core of what we estimate. Armenian firms could continue to 
produce according to Gosstandard (GOST) standards for the CIS market or at home if they 
choose to do so. On the other hand, requiring Armenian firms to adopt EU technical regulations 
in goods and especially all SPS requirements will likely impose very high costs. It does not 
appear that the benefits of these mandatory requirements are justified in all cases without actual 15 
 
membership in the EU. Experience of the new Eastern Expansion EU members during accession 
shows that, despite vast accession support from the EU, large parts of their food industry were 
forced  out  of  business,  since  the  upgrades  needed  to  meet  the  EC  requirements  were  not 
commercially feasible. As a result, a more gradual adaptation to EU SPS requirements through 
choosing to adopt EU SPS requirements on a case by case basis where the benefits exceed the 
costs seems appropriate. 
11     
Comparative steady state formulation 
In this  version of our  model, we allow the capital  stock to  adjust to its  steady state 
equilibrium along with all of the model features we employ in our WTO reference case, i.e., we 
allow for tariff and FDI liberalization with endogenous productivity effects as above. We call 
this our comparative steady state model. In the comparative static model, we assume that the 
capital  stock  is  fixed  and  the  rental  rate  on  capital  is  endogenously  determined.  In  the 
comparative steady state model, the logic is reversed. We assume that the capital stock is in its 
initial steady state equilibrium in the benchmark dataset, but that the capital stock will adjust to a 
new steady state equilibrium based on a fixed rate of return demanded by investors. That is, if 
the trade policy shock happens to induce and increase in the rate of return on capital so that it 
exceeds the initial rate of return, investors will invest and expand the capital stock. Expansion of 
                                                           
11 A similar view was expressed in the report of the World Bank (2007, p. 65). It states: Several of the CIS 
countries have expressed the desire to harmonize their standards with the EU. …For the CIS countries, even those 
intending to join the EU, complete harmonization with EU food safety and agricultural health legislations is neither 
necessary nor, at present, realistic, considering the high costs involved. The new EU members received large-scale 
financial and technical support from the EU for their accession process. The new EU member states received, over a 
seven-year period, accumulated SAPARD support for agro-processing and marketing of about 18 percent of their 
agricultural GDP in 2000, or €357 per person employed in agriculture in 2003, of which the EU paid more than one-
third. Under PHARE they also received sizable EC support for their public sector for SPS-related expenses, with 
accumulated amounts in the range of one-third of the EC support under SAPARD. For non-EU accession countries, 
implementing the required changes without such support would outstrip public and private capacities. Realistic 
options are selective convergence or obtaining third-country status to EU accession, each of which has different 
strategic and resource implications. Selective convergence can mean that selected parts of the relevant legislation 
and regulations are used as specimens for modernization or for harmonization for purposes of trade in particular 
products. Third country status—used for livestock and fisheries  products—means that a country‘s regulations, 
inspection methods, and capabilities are considered equivalent to those of the EC.  EU accession, on the other hand, 
requires full adoption of the Acquis Communautaire for domestic production, processing, and marketing. 
Experience of the new EU members during accession shows that, despite vast accession support from the EU, large 
parts of their food industry were forced out of business, since the upgrades needed to meet the EC requirements 
were not commercially feasible. Given the tremendous costs involved, it is therefore not realistic for CIS countries 
to pursue full adoption of EU standards.  
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the capital stock drives down the marginal product of capital, i.e., it drives down the rental rate 
on capital, until the rate of return on capital falls back to the initial level.
12  To analyze trade 
policy, this comparative steady state approach has been employed  by many authors, including 
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996, 1997) and Baldwin et al. (1999) and Francois et al. (1996). 
The approach, however, dates back to the 1970s, when both Hansen and Koopmans (1972) and 
Dantzig and Manne (1974) used it. The approach ignores the foregone consumption necessary to 
achieve the higher level of investment and thus, is an upper bound estimate on the long run gains 
within the framework of the model assumptions. 
IV.  Data of the Model and Evidence for Key Elasticities 
Input-output matrix 
The core of the model data consists of an input-output table. No official recent input-
output table for Armenia exists, so we produced the table based on data provided by the National 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia. Our data sources include an unbalanced supply-use 
table with 16 sectors for the year 2006 and detailed data on GDP for 2007 by types of income, 
expenditure, and production. The supply-use table contains all the elements we need for the 
input-output table, but supply deviates significantly from use in most of the sectors. We therefore 
develop a balancing procedure to arrive at a balanced input-output table. The procedure involves 
an optimization problem in which the elements of the table are adjusted such that the sum of the 
squared  deviations  from  the  initial  values  are  minimized  and  subject  to  a  number  of  side 
constraints, including supply-use balance. As part of the procedure, we also use detailed GDP 
data to update the dataset to the year 2007. Finally, we disaggregate two services sectors to get 
more details on transport, communication and financials sectors. The final table contains 21 





                                                           
12 The rate of return on investment in our model is the rental rate on capital divided by the cost of 
a unit of the capital good.    17 
 
Trade data by regional partner and sector 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we 
used trade data published by the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia
13. The 
data is for the year 2007 and shows exports and imports by country and commodity.  
The regions of our model are Armenia, the European Union, the CIS, and the Rest of the 
World. For the European Union, we took the 27 member countries as of 2007. For the CIS, we 
include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Rest of the World is the residual.  
The data is reported according to the Harmonized System (HS) classification at the two 
digit level. We mapped the HS-commodities into the sectors of our model.  The exact mapping 
and results for both exports and imports are reported in Appendix A. 
Tariff data—Collected rates at the tariff line level 
We received data on collected import duties (tariffs) and import values at the four digit 
tariff line level (again using the Harmonized System classification) from the Armenian Customs 
Authority. The collected tariff rates for the sectors in our model are obtained by first aggregating 
the four digit tariff line level tariff collections and import values to the sectors of our model. The 
ratio of tariff collections to import values for each sector of our model is then calculated to give 
estimates of the collected tariff rates, which in turn are incorporated into our dataset. The tariff 
rates are shown in table 4 of appendix A. Applying these tariff rates across all sectors implies 
that tariff revenue in the revised database is about 1% of GDP, which is consistent with collected 
revenues in Armenia.
14   
Given that Armenia participates in preferential trade areas with the othe r CIS member 
states, it was necessary to make further adjustments. That is, since, in principle, tariff rates 
should be zero within these preferential trade areas, we set tariff collections on imports from CIS 
countries at zero. We then increased the tariff rates for the other regions in our model so that the 
overall weighted average collected tariff rate is unchanged  at the tariff line level. We used the 
trade flow data, disaggregated by regions and sectors of our model to weight the tariff rates. This 
                                                           
13 http://www.armstat.am/file/article/ft_2nish_07_14.pdf 
14 For the year 2008, aggregate data from Armenia show that tariff collections are 1% of GDP.  18 
 
adjustment has the impact of raising the collected tariff rates for the regions in our model where 
positive  tariff  rates  apply.  The  resulting  adjusted  tariff  rates  are  also  reported  in  table  4  of 
appendix A. 
Share of market captured by multinational service providers  
It  was  necessary  to  calculate  the  market  share  of  multinational  firms  in  the  services 
sectors by region of the model.  Take the banking sector as an example. We need to know the 
share of the market captured by Armenian, EU, CIS and Rest of the World firms, where the 
countries in the regions are defined in table 1. This entailed acquiring a list of all banks operating 
in Armenia along with their market share, and, when the bank is owned by multiple parties, 
allocating the ownership across the regions of our model. The database www.armbanks.am was 
sufficient for this task in most cases, but websites of the banks had to be consulted to allocate 
ownership shares in several cases. The results, by region and sector, are presented in appendix B.  
Share of expatriate labor employed by multinational service providers  
The impact of liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services 
sectors on the demand for labor in these sectors will depend on the share of expatriate labor used 
by multinational firms. Despite the fact that multinationals use Armenian labor less intensively 
than their Armenian competitors, if multinationals use mostly Armenian labor, their expansion is 
likely to increase the demand for Armenian labor in these sectors.
15  As estimates of the share of 
expatriate labor or specialized technology not available to  Armenian firms that is used by 
multinational service providers in  Armenia, we used estimates from other studies i n these 
sectors.
16 We have found that multinational service providers use mostly local primary factor 
inputs and only small amounts of expatriate labor or specialized technology. Our estimated share 
of foreign inputs used by multinationals in  Armenia  is presented in the table on  sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
                                                           
15 See Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) for a detailed explanation on why FDI may be a 
partial equilibrium substitute for domestic labor but a general equilibrium complement.  
16 See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2007) for Russia and Jensen and Tarr (2008) for Kazakhstan. Theory would 
suggest that small countries may have a greater need to expatriate labor compared with large countries.   19 
 
Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticities of substitution for goods 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities 
of substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua 
Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 countries. Among the 73 countries, there were  no CIS 
countries, but Lithuania is in their sample. As a former Soviet Union economy with a population 
about the size of Armenia, we choose Lithuania as our proxy.    We explain in appendix C, how 
we mapped the 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors estimated by Broda et al. into the sectors 
of our model. The mapping and resulting elasticities by relevant sector in our model are shown in 
table C1. For the manufacturing sector, we get a trade weighted elasticity of 8.  
Elasticities of varieties with  respect  to price--evidence on the role  of trade and FDI in 
increasing total factor productivity through technology transfer as a function of research 
and development intensity of the trading partner 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) have developed models of economic growth that have 
highlighted the role of trade in a greater variety of intermediate goods as a vehicle for 
technological spillovers that allow less developed countries to close the technological gap with 
industrialized countries.  Similarly, Romer (1994) has argued that product variety is a crucial and 
often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is the 
greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there are 
other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.
17 Consequently, we 
take variety as a metaphor for the various ways increased trade can increase productivity. 
Winters et al. (2004) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that ―the recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on 
productivity and its rate of change.‖ Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the 
following. Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 
1.2 percent per year in the ―true‖ import price index. Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott 
                                                           
17 Trade or services liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive impact on 
the development of institutions (see Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004).  It may also induce 
firms to move down their average cost curves, or import higher quality products or shift 
production to more efficient firms within an industry.  Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find 
evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican manufacturing firms. 20 
 
(2004) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between 
nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of exports in a sector increases total 
factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and Korea, and they have 
some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. In business 
services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a diverse set 
of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. The evidence for this 
was cited in the introduction section. 
Beginning with the path-breaking work of Coe and Helpman (1995), a rich literature now 
exists that has empirically investigated the transmission of knowledge through the purchase of 
imported intermediate goods and through foreign direct investment.  We summarize this 
literature in appendix H.  In summary, this literature shows that the purchase of intermediate 
inputs and FDI from industrialized countries is an important mechanism for the transmission of 
R&D and productivity growth in developing countries. For small developing countries, trading 
with large technologically advanced countries is crucial for TFP growth.  But for products in 
which developing countries have a comparative advantage, developing country trade may be 
important for spillovers.  
In our model, the parameter that reflects the ability of a region to increase total factor 
productivity through the transmission of new technologies is the elasticity of varieties with 
respect to the price.  Schiff et al., (2002, table 1) have shown that for R&D intensive sectors, 
trade with industrialized countries contributes significantly to total factor productivity in 
developing countries, but trade with developing countries does not. Averaging over the industries 
in Schiff et al.,( 2002, table 3) yields that trade with industrialized countries in R&D intensive 
products is about eight times more valuable for developing country TFP increases.  On the other 
hand, for sectors that are low in R&D intensity, their results suggest that for technology diffusion 
trade with developing countries can be as important as trade with industrialized countries.  
Based on these considerations, we first classify the increasing returns to scale sectors of 
our model into low, medium and high technology sectors. Due to lack of data for Armenia, the 
classification is defined by the share of R&D expenditures in total sales, based on U.S. data.  For 
low R&D intensive sectors, we assume that the elasticity of firms with respect to price is the 
same for the CIS region as for the EU, but the elasticity is only one-third of Rest of the World 21 
 
elasticity (trade with the CIS or EU regions misses out on trade with China or the U.S.). For 
medium and high R&D intensive sectors, we assume that trade and FDI with the CIS region is 
only one-eighth as valuable as trade with the Rest of the World (as discussed above), while trade 
with the EU is two-thirds as valuable as trade with the Rest of the World.  Finally, we allow the 
elasticity of the Rest of the World to vary depending on the R&D intensity of the sector, where 
we allow for more technology diffusion in more R&D intensive sectors. The results of these 
assumptions are in table 6b.
18  
To determine the impact of this parameter on the results, we conduct three types of 
sensitivity analysis on these parameters: systematic sensitivity analysis, piecemeal sensitivity 
analysis and a third where we simulate the model 100 times. When we conduct sensitivity 
analysis, we scale all the elasticities from 0.5 times their central values to 1.5 times their central 
values.  
 
V. Results for Deep Liberalization: Central Elasticity Case 
We  execute  several  scenarios  to  assess  the  impacts  of  Armenia‘s  broad  trade  policy 
options, where liberalization of services is featured in all scenarios. First, we consider the impact 
of Armenia entering into a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the 
European Union. Second, we evaluate the impact of deepening the CIS free trade agreement by 
adding preferential liberalization of services in the CIS; third, we evaluate combining a DCFTA 
with the EU with preferential liberalization of services with the CIS; fourth, in the scenario we 
call ―unilateral,‖ we combine the impact of a DCFTA with the EU, preferential liberalization of 
services with the CIS, and unilateral liberalization of tariffs and services with the rest of the 
world; finally, we add the impact of reducing geographically non-discriminatory services barriers 
in Armenia to the unilateral scenario. We discuss the results for each of these broad policy 
options in turn.    
 
 
                                                           
18 On the other hand, table 6a shows that the CIS has a larger share of the market than the EU in most services 
sectors. This will have the effect of yielding larger gains for liberalization with respect to the CIS.  22 
 
Impact of the DCFTA with the EU 
Aggregate Effects. A DCFTA with the EU is a complex agreement that will contain 
numerous chapters. Overall, we assess that the agreement with result in gains to Armenia of 1.4 
percent of consumption in the medium term and 1.8 percent of consumption in the long run. We 
focus on five of the most important impacts that impact on trade and real incomes and assess 
their  impacts  separately  to  determine  the  source  of  these  gains.  These  are:  (i)    preferential 
reduction in the of barriers in services with the EU that reduced the ad valorem equivalents of the 
barriers by 50 percent; (ii) a reduction in border costs; which will reduce border costs for trade 
with the EU most strongly, but will also reduce border costs with third countries, including the 
CIS; (iii) a reduction in standards costs of trading with the EU; (iv) elimination of tariff barriers 
against the EU; and (v) the impact on the investment climate from the four above mentioned 
impacts. We analyze each of these components in turn. 
Services  Liberalization. We estimate that the impact  of preferential  liberalization of 
services  with  EU  will  result  in  a  welfare  gain  to  Armenia  of  0.4  percent  of  Armenian 
consumption  (measured  by  Hicks  an  equivalent  variation).  In  this  scenario  we  assume  that 
Armenian discriminatory barriers against EU multinational service providers are reduced by 50 
percent in all sectors except airline services.  In airline services, we assume that barriers are 
reduced by 25 percent due to the fact that several barriers in airlines will not be affected by a 
DCFTA.
19  The gains from preferential services liberalization are smaller than we have observed 
in other applications, such as in Russia (Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2007), Kazakhstan (Jensen 
and Tarr, 2008), Tanzania (Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2010) and Kenya (Balistreri, Rutherford 
and Tarr, 2009). There are two reasons for this. First,  the estimated discriminatory ad valorem 
equivalents of the barriers against multinational providers of services in Armenia  are a lot lower 
than we have observed in these other applications  (see table 4). Second, the liberalization is 
preferential, so there are lost services varieties from all regions other than the EU. The loss in 
varieties from other regions results in a loss of productivity and ultimately welfare.  .  
EU  Tariff  Liberalization.  In  this  scenario,  we  assess  the  impacts  of  preferentially 
removing tariffs on imports of goods imported from the EU, with no other policy changes. We 
                                                           
19 For example, airline services can only be provided within the framework of an international 
agreement. This is not likely be changed by a DCFTA.  23 
 
find this  will lead to  a  loss of welfare  for Armenia equal  to  -0.08 percent  of consumption. 
Although  the  welfare  loss  is  not  large,  it  deserves  explanation.  There  are  two  primary 
explanations--loss of tariff revenue of displaced imports from the Rest of the World and loss of 
manufactured good varieties from the Rest of the World.  .  
The EU has a minority share in manufactured and agricultural goods imports in Armenia. 
For manufactured goods, 45 percent of imports come from the Rest of the World region, while 
only 30 percent is from the EU. In agriculture, only 6 percent of imports originate in the EU, 
while 45 percent originate in the Rest of the World. Preferential tariff liberalization with respect 
to the EU results in a displacement of Rest of the World imports and a loss of tariff revenue on 
those imports.  
To  isolate  the  tariff  loss  impact  from  the  productivity  impact,  we  executed  the 
preferential tariff liberalization scenario in model with perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale model in all goods sectors.  In this scenario, there are no productivity impacts from 
additional varieties of goods. We find that there is a very small welfare loss for preferential 
reduction of barriers against EU imports equal to -0.001 percent of consumption. Thus, the tariff 
loss on rest of world imports is enough to offset any welfare gains from additional imports from 
the EU region, but the tariff loss is not sufficient to give significantly negative welfare impacts.  
The difference between the welfare loss of -0.001 in the perfectly competitive case and 
the welfare loss of -0.08 in the full model must be due to loss of varieties from regions other than 
the EU. That is, preferential liberalization of tariffs against the EU induces additional varieties 
from the EU, but loss of varieties from the Rest of the World, CIS and Armenia. Given the large 
share of the Rest of the World in manufacturing imports of Armenia, the number of varieties lost 
from this region is relatively large.  
Improved Trade Facilitation, including reduced border costs.  In this scenario, called 
―border costs‖ in the table, we evaluate the impact of improved trade facilitation in Armenia as a 
result of the DCFTA with the EU. We assume that the costs of importing from or exporting to 
the EU declines by 2.5 percent of total production costs and the costs of non-EU trade fall by 2.3 
or 2.2 percent of total production costs. (See appendix D for an elaboration of the methodology.) 
We evaluate the welfare gain from improved trade facilitation at 1.0 percent of consumption. 24 
 
That is, this scenario suggests that the largest source of gains from the DCFTA with the EU is 
due to its impact on lowering the costs of trade transport on both imports and exports on both EU 
and non-EU trade.     
Harmonization with EU Standards. In this scenario, labeled EU standards, we evaluate 
the  impact  of  harmonization  with  EU  standards  as  part  of  the  DCFTA.  As  we  explain  in 
appendix E, we assess that the costs of meeting EU standards for Armenian exporters will fall by 
25 percent for agricultural and manufacturing exports to the EU (from 15.8 of production costs to 
11.8 percent of production costs in agriculture and from 21.6 percent of production costs to 16.2 
percent of production costs in the case of manufacturing. On the other hand, there are adjustment 
costs  of  adapting  to  the  new  standards  that  we  assess  raise  the  costs  of  production  by  2 
percentage points. This cost reduction applies only to Armenian firms exporting to the EU and 
only on the agriculture and manufacturing sectors.  
We  assess  that  Armenia  will  gain  0.1  percent  of  consumption  as  a  result  of  the 
harmonization  of  standards.  The  gains  in  standards  are  considerably  less  than  from  trade 
facilitation. This is due to the fact that the standards costs reduction is limited to exports to the 
EU on a subset of all exports, whereas trade facilitation cost reduction is assumed to apply to all 
products, on both imports and exports and there is some cost reduction for all trade partners.  
EU DCFTA Steady-State. As discussed above, we assess the potentially positive impact 
of the DCFTA on the investment climate by executing a ―steady-state‖ scenario. In this scenario, 
the capital stock adjusts to its long run equilibrium in response to an increase in the real return on 
capital. We estimate that the welfare gain will increase to 1.8 percent of consumption in this 
scenario. This is a modest increase over the comparative static result, but not striking. It reflects 
that the real return on capital increases only modestly in the comparative static scenario.   
Similarly,  in  the  scenario  ―unilateral  steady  state‖  and  the  scenario  ―unilateral  and 
domestic steady state‖ we estimate approximately a 30 percent increase in the welfare gain in the 
steady state scenario relative to the comparative static scenario. Again, this reflects a modest 
increase in the rate of return on capital in the comparative static scenario.     
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Small gains from preferential liberalization of services with the CIS region 
   In the case of preferential liberalization of services barriers with the CIS region (to reduce 
the ad valorem equivalent by 50 percent), the gains are smaller—0.10 percent of consumption. 
The agreement with the EU includes tariff reduction, while tariff free access in the CIS region is 
considered part of the status quo; so the appropriate scenario for comparison of the relative gains 
for Armenia is the scenario labeled EU Discriminatory Services. The gains for Armenia of an 
agreement with the EU are four times greater than the gains from an agreement with the CIS 
region.  
  Why are the gains larger for the agreement with the EU?  As we discussed above, trade 
with and FDI from large technologically advanced regions can be expected to lead to technology 
diffusion that increases total factor productivity. Although trade and FDI from small developing 
countries can contribute to technology diffusion, it has been estimated to do so to a significantly 
lesser  extent,  at  least  for  research  and  development  intensive  sectors.  The  elasticity  of  the 
number of varieties (firms) with respect to price is the parameter in our model that captures that 
effect, and the values we have chosen are in table 6B.
20  Table 21 shows that we estimate that the 
number of varieties from the EU substantially increases  in air transportation, banking and 
insurance as a result of preferential li beralization with the EU, while table 18 shows that the 
estimated expansion of varieties from the CIS region is much more modest (except in insurance) 
in response to preferential liberalization with respect to the  CIS  region.  We show in the 
sensitivity analysis below that this elasticity of supply parameter is very important for the results: 
preferential agreements in services are more likely to be beneficial the higher the supply 
elasticities of the partner country‘s services suppliers and the lower the supply elasticities of the 
excluded countries services suppliers.  
 
                                                           
20 The elasticity of supply corresponds to the share of the sector‘s costs that are due to a specific 
factor of production.  In all of the imperfectly competitive sectors, we assume there are four 
specific factors: one for each region in the model. Then, as industry output expands, the price of 
the specific factor necessary for production of that variety increases, thereby increasing the cost of 
production of firms. Since the cost of production of firms increases as the industry supply 
increases, the supply curve of each region will slope up in each of these sectors. And higher cost 
shares of the specific factor will lead to less elastic supply curves in that sector. 26 
 
Combining the CIS FTA with a DCFTA with Europe-- more substantial gains 
In tables 7 and 8, in the column labeled ―EU-CIS FTA,‖ we show our estimates for the 
impacts of agreeing to a FTA with both the EU and the CIS region. The estimated gains are 
approximately the sum of the separate agreements. This shows that Armenia can augment the 
gains it may realize from an agreement with the EU, by adding a preferential services agreement 
with its CIS partners.   
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) found that, for Chile, the gains from combining free 
trade agreements would be more than additive. Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel (2004) 
found similar results for Brazil. That is, the gains of the two agreements combined exceeded the 
gains of the two separate agreements. The reason is that if Chile, for example, agreed to a free 
trade agreement with the U.S., then competition from the U.S. would greatly reduce the trade 
diversion associated with an agreement with neighboring developing countries. But there are the 
possibilities of trade diversion with the rest of the world region, so the gains from combined 
agreements are not necessarily greater than the gains from the separate agreements. 
  Non-discriminatory  liberalization  of  services  and  tariff  barriers  would  result  in 
about a three-fold increase in the gains compared with preferential liberalization of goods 
and services with the EU alone.  With non-discriminatory liberalization, Armenians would be 
able to access goods and services from the least cost supplier in the world. This would eliminate 
all  trade  diversion  losses  and  result  in  the  maximum  number  of  new  foreign  varieties  for 
productivity improvement from trade and FDI liberalization. Consequently, the gains, which hare 
equal to 1.1 percent of consumption, are much larger in this case than in the comparable case of 
preferential liberalization with the EU (between 0.4 and 0.3 percent of consumption for service 
and goods liberalization alone) or the CIS alone. The larger gains from the agreement with the 
EU come from trade facilitation cost reduction, not from services liberalization. Over 85 percent 





Additional gains would be derived from reduction in the barriers that domestic as well as 
foreign firms face 
    If inefficient regulatory barriers that do not discriminate against foreign firms were also 
reduced by 50 percent, additional gains of 0.4 percent of consumption would be realized. This is 
a relatively low additional gain in comparison with some earlier work (Balestreri, Rutherford and 
Tarr, 2009; Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2010). It reflects a relatively efficient legal framework 
for domestic services in Armenia.  
Sector impacts 
  In table 9, we present  results  for the percentage change in  output by sector for four 
scenarios: an FTA with the EU; and FTA with the CIS region; and FTA with the EU and the CIS 
region combined; and unilateral liberalization. Details of what is included in these scenarios are 
explained in table 7.   
  In general we see an expansion of the output of the business services sectors, as the 
removal of discriminatory barriers induces more foreign direct investment.  Multinational firms 
in  the business  services sectors  who locate in  Armenia have  their output defined as  part of 
Armenian  industry  output.  Preferential  reduction  of  barriers  against  one  region,  generally 
reduces the number of firms from the other three regions in the model, but on balance the output 
of the sector expands.  To see what happens to EU firms, versus Armenian and other firms, it is 
necessary to view the tables that report the change in the number of firms by scenario.   
Given  that  we  assume  that  total  employment  and  the  capital  stock  are  fixed  in  the 
medium term, if labor expands in some sectors, it must contract in other sectors. Given the 
expansion in several sectors, we must have declines in others in the medium term. What is 
striking about the output results is how small the output declines are. In other applications, we 
have observed significant output declines in some sectors in the unilateral liberalization scenario. 
This is because we assume zero tariffs in our unilateral reform scenario. The mild output declines 
reflect  the  low  level  of  tariff  protection  in  Armenia  in  the  benchmark  equilibrium.  In  our 28 
 
unilateral liberalization scenario, we do observe output declines in agriculture and manufacturing 
of 1.6 percent, as these are the only sectors that are protected by tariffs in the initial data.  
  Outside of business services, the sectors that expand depend on the scenario. In our 
unilateral liberalization scenario, we estimate that the hotel and restaurant sector, other transport 
services and wholesale and retail trade, and post and courier services are the sectors that will 
expand the greatest. These sectors are relatively intensive users of business services, such as 
transportation and banking services. Regulatory reforms will decrease the price and allow for 
quality improvements in these business services, which permits the using sectors to operate more 
cheaply and offer better quality services. 
  With the EC DCFTA, we estimate that wholesale and retail trade and mining and 
quarrying would be the main sectors that expand outside of business services. The expansion of 
business services is less strong than in unilateral liberalization, so intensive users of business 
services, like hotels and restaurants, gain less.  
VI. Sensitivity Analysis 
  In this section we assess the impact of parameter values and key modeling assumptions 
on  the  results.  Through  our  ―piecemeal  sensitivity  analysis‖  we  will  determine  the  most 
important parameters for the results, and we will assess how important for the results are rent 
capture or additional varieties from reform in services sectors under increasing returns to scale.  
In the piecemeal sensitivity analysis, we change the value of a single parameter while holding the 
values of all other parameters unchanged at our central elasticity values. We present piecemeal 
sensitivity  analysis  of  the  two  most  relevant  policy  scenarios.  In  table  22,  we  examine  the 
prospective free trade agreement with the EU and in table 23 we examine the agreement with the 
CIS region.  
Given uncertainty of parameter values and the rent capture assumption, point estimates of 
the results may be viewed with skepticism. In our ―systematic sensitivity analysis,‖ we execute 
30,000 simulations.  In each simulation, we allow the computer to randomly select the values of 
all parameters, subject to the specified probability distributions of the parameters.  Through the 29 
 
systematic sensitivity analysis we will be able to assess how robust the results are and obtain 
confidence intervals of the results.   
Rent capture assumption 
In the row labeled θr we retain the increasing returns to scale assumption in the services 
sectors and selected goods sectors, but allow initial rent capture in the services sectors to be 
either zero (central value ) or 100 percent (upper value). The welfare gain with no rent capture is 
1.44 percent of consumption but falls to 1.37 percent of consumption with initial rent capture. 
The fall is modest in relation to the overall gains, due to the fact that border costs, not service 
sector gains dominate the welfare results.  
In the case of an agreement with the CIS region, the gains fall even more dramatically in 
percentage  terms,  from  a  welfare  gain  of  0.10  percent  of  consumption  to  0.01  percent  of 
consumption in our central elasticity case.  
Impact of constant returns to scale—Possible negative welfare effects 
  In the row labeled ―θr –CRTS model,‖ we assume constant returns to scale in all sectors; 
this  eliminates  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  externality  from  additional  varieties.  We  allow  initial  rent 
capture in the services sectors to be either zero (central value) or 100 percent (upper value). We 
see that without the Dixit-Stiglitz variety externality, the gains from an agreement with the EU 
fall  dramatically  and  are  estimated  to  be  negative  with  the  CIS  region  (-0.03  percent  of 
consumption) in the case of initial rent capture. With no initial rent capture, the gains for the EU 
agreement would be approximately 0.73 percent of consumption and would fall to 0.67 with 
initial rent capture. In the case of an agreement with the CIS region, the gains are 0.06 with no 
initial rent capture and are -0.03 with initial rent capture.  
Piecemeal sensitivity analysis 
  Three parameters stand out as having a strong impact on the results. The elasticity of 
substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive goods and services sectors, ˃(qi, 
qj)  has  a  very  strong  impact.    Following  from  the  Le  Chatelier  principle,  larger  elasticities 
typically lead to larger welfare gains in response to welfare improving reforms, as the economy 
can adapt more readily. This holds for the elasticities in the EU DCFTA scenario. Unlike other 30 
 
elasticities, however, a lower value of ˃(qi,qj) can increase the welfare gains. This holds for the 
lower value of this elasticity in goods and services and the upper value in goods. This is because 
lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are less close to each other, so additional 
varieties are worth more. In the case of goods in the EU DCFTA and in the case of the CIS 
piecemeal sensitivity, lower values of this parameter increase the estimated welfare gains.  The 
elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services, ˃(va, bs), also has a strong  
impact. The better firms are able to substitute business services for labor and capital, the more 
the  economy  will  gain  from  the  reforms  that  reduce  the  quality  adjusted  price  of  business 
services.  Finally, for the agreement with the EU, a strong impact comes from changes in the 
value of ʵEU, the elasticity of EU multinational service firm supply with respect to the price of 
EU services in Armenia. Larger values of this parameter mean that tariff preferences that open 
opportunities for EU service firms to provide new varieties, will not be so quickly choked by the 
increased cost of the specific factor required for EU firm expansion. Similarly, for the agreement 
with the CIS region, ʵAFR, the elasticity of CIS multinational service firm supply with respect to 
the price of CIS services in Armenia has a strong impact. We conduct more detailed sensitivity 
analysis on this parameter below. 
Systematic sensitivity analysis  
  In the systematic sensitivity analysis, we execute the model 30,000 times and harvest the 
results  for desired variables.  In  each individual simulation,  we allow the computer to  select 
values of all the parameters in the model (the parameters in table 22), based on the specified 
probability density functions (pdfs) of the parameters. We assume uniform probability density 
functions, with upper and lower values of the pdfs given by the upper and lower values in the 
piecemeal sensitivity analysis table. We include initial rent capture in the systematic sensitivity 
analysis, with the rent capture parameter allowed to take values between zero and one with a 
uniform pdf.   
The welfare results for a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU are 
depicted in figure 1.  A 95 percent confidence interval for the gain in equivalent variation as a 
percent of consumption is: 1.01 percent to 1.84 percent. There are no simulations with negative 
estimated welfare changes.   31 
 
  In figures 2 and 3, we show ―box and whisper‖ diagrams for the sample distribution of 
the percentage change in output by sector.  Sectors are on the horizontal axis and the percentage 
change  in  output  is  shown  on  the  vertical  axis.  The  bars  in  the  box  are  the  means  of  the 
distributions. Fifty percent confidence intervals are depicted by the boxes, while the vertical lines 
show 95 percent confidence intervals.  
The  means  of  the  systematic  sensitivity  results  show  a  similar  pattern  to  the  point 
estimates regarding the expansion of the services sectors. The business services sectors, mining 
and quarrying and wholesale and retail trade sectors are the sectors that we estimate will expand. 
While the confidence intervals are rather tight for most sectors (95 percent confidence intervals 
for the significantly expanding sectors are virtually all positive), they reveal a large range of 
uncertainty for hotels and restaurants.  
The results for preferential reduction of barriers with CIS partners on welfare, output and 
labor  are  shown  in  figures  4-6.  The  welfare  results  for  preferential  reduction  of  barriers  in 
services with the CIS region, depicted in figure 6, are impacted significantly by the fact that we 
allow the rent capture parameter to vary between 0 and 1. The median result is between the two 
extreme values in the piecemeal sensitivity table for rent capture.  Losses can occur when the 
share of rent capture in services by Armenian nationals is high. A 95 percent confidence interval 
for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 0.003 to 0.147. There is a negative value 
for equivalent variation in 576 simulations.   
Regarding output impacts of a services agreement with the CIS, results appear rather 
robust  within  a  95  percent  confidence  interval  with  the  exception  of  air  transport  and 
telecommunications.  The  sensitivity  analysis  reveals  that  we  cannot  have  a  great  deal  of 
confidence in the sign of the impacts for air transportation.  
VII. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have developed an innovative small open economy computable general 
equilibrium model of the Armenian economy that is capable of assessing the impact of a deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union. In addition to preferential 
tariff liberalization, we have examined preferential liberalization of barriers against multinational 32 
 
service providers, harmonization of Armenian standards with EU standards and reduction of 
trade and border costs. We have also assessed the impact of preferential liberalization of services 
with the CIS region and compared all results with wider non-discriminatory liberalization. We 
find that Armenia would lose from a shallow free trade agreement with the EU, that is, a free 
trade agreement that preferentially liberalizes  good alone. This is due primarily to a loss of 
productivity from excluded varieties of manufactured products from the non-EU regions. But 
Armenia would gain substantially from a DCFTA with the EU, due to inclusion of services 
liberalization, reduction of trade and border costs and harmonization of standards.  
Armenia  would  obtain  only  small  gains  from  a  preferential  reduction  of  barriers  in 
services with the CIS region in our central elasticity case. Gains from liberalization with the EU 
region are considerably larger because of the larger amount of technology diffusion associated 
with trade and FDI with large industrialized countries, captured in our model as a relatively large 
increase in  the number of varieties.  Non-discriminatory liberalization of goods  and services, 
however, will produce gains about three times larger than preferential liberalization of goods and 
services with the EU alone.  
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Table 1 -- List of Sectors, Factors and Regions in the Armenia Model 
Business Services Other goods and services
Telecommunication Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Insurance Electricity, gas and water supply
Banking Construction
Air transport Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Transport via pipelines Hotels and restaurants
Railway transport Road transport
Auxiliary transport activities
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods Post and courier activities
Mining and quarrying Real estate and professional services
Manufacturing Public administration and defence
Education
Regions Health and social work
Armenia Other social and personal services
EU: The 27 members of the European Union
CIS+Georgia: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Factors of Production
Rest of the World: All other countries Labor, capital  40 
 
Table 2 -- Sectoral value-added (%, unless otherwise indicated)  
Capital (%) Labor (%) bnDram % of total
Business Services
Transport via railways 46.0 54.0 12.0 0.4
Transport via pipelines 46.0 54.0 7.3 0.2
Air transport 46.0 54.0 42.0 1.4
Telecommunications 46.0 54.0 90.1 2.9
Insurance 66.3 33.7 0.9 0.0
Banking 66.3 33.7 70.9 2.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 47.9 52.1 51.6 1.7
Manufacturing 46.9 53.1 332.8 10.9
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 75.6 24.4 575.2 19.2
Electricity, gas and water supply 38.5 61.5 122.7 4.1
Construction 56.0 44.0 865.5 29.0
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 61.6 38.4 363.0 12.0
Hotels and restaurants 25.2 74.8 10.6 0.3
Other land transport 46.0 54.0 36.1 1.2
Auxiliary transport activities 46.0 54.0 14.2 0.5
Post and courier activities 46.0 54.0 1.0 0.0
Real estate and professional services 85.7 14.3 107.2 3.5
Public administration and defence 7.6 92.4 90.7 3.0
Education 23.1 76.9 98.5 3.3
Health and social work 56.0 44.0 89.6 3.0




Table 3 -- Trade Flows 
bnDram % of total % of supply bnDram % of total % of output
Business Services
Transport via railways 5.9 0.5 27.4 3.1 0.7 16.5
Transport via pipelines 3.6 0.3 27.4 1.9 0.4 16.5
Air transport 20.9 1.9 27.4 11.0 2.5 16.5
Telecommunications 44.7 4.1 27.4 23.5 5.4 16.5
Insurance 0.1 0.0 12.7 0.1 0.0 9.5
Banking 11.2 1.0 12.7 8.0 1.9 9.5
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 70.4 6.4 63.5 50.5 11.7 57.3
Manufacturing 823.0 74.6 54.6 254.6 58.8 39.0
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 42.7 3.9 5.0 6.2 1.4 0.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.3 0.4 2.5 7.4 1.7 4.3
Construction 1.4 0.1 0.1 4.0 0.9 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 16.2 1.5 42.6 7.8 1.8 26.3
Other land transport 17.9 1.6 27.4 9.4 2.2 16.5
Auxiliary transport activities 7.1 0.6 27.4 3.7 0.9 16.5
Post and courier activities 0.5 0.0 27.4 0.3 0.1 16.5
Real estate and professional services 8.7 0.8 6.3 20.1 4.6 13.5
Public administration and defence 6.8 0.6 4.2 3.9 0.9 2.5
Education 10.7 1.0 9.0 9.8 2.3 8.3
Health and social work 2.7 0.2 2.1 5.0 1.2 3.8





Table 4 -- Benchmark Distortions (%) 
Standards
Output tax Tariff Imports Exports for EU exports All firms Foreign firms
Business Services
Transport via railways 2.5 20.0
Transport via pipelines 2.5 40.0
Air transport 2.5 106.8
Telecommunications 2.5 1.7 0.3
Insurance 0.7 9.6 15.8
Banking 0.7 1.5 5.6
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 2.4 9.1 8.9
Manufacturing 1.5 4.3 9.1 8.9 21.6
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.7 10.1 9.1 8.9 15.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.8
Construction 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 1.2
Hotels and restaurants 4.5
Other land transport 2.1
Auxiliary transport activities 2.1
Post and courier activities 2.1
Real estate and professional services 1.9
Public administration and defence 0.5
Education 0.1
Health and social work 0.3
Other social and personal services 6.3












Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0 100 0 0 100 0
Transport via pipelines 0 100 0 0 100 0
Air transport 30 30 41 30 30 41
Telecommunications 6 39 55 6 39 55
Insurance 30 57 14 30 57 14
Banking 21 49 30 21 49 30
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 28 62 9 42 23 35
Manufacturing 30 25 45 33 31 36
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 6 49 45 13 83 4
Electricity, gas and water supply 0 0 100 0 0 100
Construction 0 0 100 0 0 100
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 0 0 100 0 0 100
Hotels and restaurants 0 0 100 0 0 100
Other land transport 0 0 100 0 0 100
Auxiliary transport activities 0 0 100 0 0 100
Post and courier activities 0 0 100 0 0 100
Real estate and professional services 0 0 100 0 0 100
Public administration and defence 0 0 100 0 0 100
Education 0 0 100 0 0 100
Health and social work 0 0 100 0 0 100
Other social and personal services 0 0 100 0 0 100
Source: Authors' estimates.  44 
 
 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0 0 100 0
Transport via pipelines 0 0 100 0
Air transport 70 9 9 12
Telecommunications 0 6 39 55
Insurance 31 20 39 10
Banking 26 16 36 22
Source: See Appendix  45 
 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 2 10 2 15
Transport via pipelines 2 10 2 15
Air transport 2 10 2 15
Telecommunications 3 13 3 20
Insurance 3 3 3 10
Banking 3 3 3 10
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 3 3 3 10
Manufacturing 2 10 2 15
Source: See Appendix  46 
 
Table 7: Summary of Results—no initial capture of rents in services by Armenians  
(results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated) 
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 
Services  EU Tariffs Border Costs EU Standards
EU FTA 
Steady-state CIS FTA EU-CIS FTA
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on CIS services firms No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No No No No
Reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No No No No
Reduction in border costs No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Reduction in standards for EU exports No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Steady-state capital stock No No No No No No Yes No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 1.4 0.4 -0.1 1.0 0.1 1.8 0.1 1.5
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 1.0 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.1
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6
Tariff revenue -40.9 0.3 -44.2 5.0 0.7 -40.4 0.1 -40.8
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.9 0.1 0.6
Aggregate exports  13.9 -0.1 2.5 9.3 1.8 15.1 0.2 14.2
Factor Earnings
Capital 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.1 2.0
Labor 2.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.1 2.9 0.1 2.0
Factor adjustments
Capital 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4
Labor 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.4
Capital stock and investment 1.9
Source: Authors' estimates.  47 
 
Table 7: Summary of Results—no initial capture of rents in services by Armenians -- continued 














Reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on CIS services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reduction in border costs No No No No No No
Reduction in standards for EU exports No No No No No No
Steady-state capital stock No No No Yes No Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 1.1 0.9 0.1 1.4 1.4 1.8
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.0
Tariff revenue -100.0 0.8 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 2.0 0.5 1.4 2.3 2.2 2.5
Aggregate exports  7.0 0.1 6.9 8.2 7.6 8.9
Factor Earnings
Capital 2.3 1.0 1.3 1.3 2.6 1.6
Labor 2.3 1.0 1.3 3.3 2.6 3.7
Factor adjustments
Capital 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.2
Labor 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
Capital stock and investment 1.9 2.1
Source: Authors' estimates.  48 
 
Table 8: Summary of Results, initial capture of rents in services by Armenians 
 (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated) 
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 
Services  EU Tariffs Border Costs EU Standards
EU FTA 
Steady-state CIS FTA EU-CIS FTA
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on CIS services firms No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No No No No
Reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No No No No
Reduction in border costs No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Reduction in standards for EU exports No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Steady-state capital stock No No No No No No Yes No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 1.4 0.3 -0.1 1.0 0.1 1.7 0.0 1.4
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 1.0 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.0 1.0
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6
Tariff revenue -40.9 0.3 -44.2 5.0 0.7 -40.5 0.0 -40.9
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.9 0.1 0.6
Aggregate exports  13.9 -0.1 2.5 9.3 1.8 15.0 0.2 14.1
Factor Earnings
Capital 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.1 2.0
Labor 2.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.1 2.9 0.1 2.1
Factor adjustments
Capital 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4
Labor 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5
Capital stock and investment 1.8
Source: Authors' estimates.  49 
 
Table 8: Summary of Results, initial capture of rents in services by Armenians -- continued 














Reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on CIS services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reduction in border costs No No No No No No
Reduction in standards for EU exports No No No No No No
Steady-state capital stock No No No Yes No Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.9 1.2
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.9
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.0
Tariff revenue -100.0 0.6 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 2.0 0.5 1.4 2.3 2.1 2.5
Aggregate exports  6.9 -0.1 6.9 8.0 7.3 8.5
Factor Earnings
Capital 2.3 0.9 1.3 1.3 2.5 1.6
Labor 2.4 1.1 1.3 3.4 2.8 3.8
Factor adjustments
Capital 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.3
Labor 0.9 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.1
Capital stock and investment 1.8 1.9
Source: Authors' estimates.50 
 
 
Table 9: Output and Employment Impacts from Liberalization 
 (% change from benchmark) 
Unilateral Liberalization EU-CIS FTA CIS FTA EU FTA
Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income
Business Services
Transport via railways 1.8 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.4
Transport via pipelines 1.8 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.4
Air transport 14.2 14.7 7.1 8.1 -0.7 -0.7 7.9 9.0
Telecommunications 2.7 3.2 1.0 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.8
Insurance 4.5 5.7 1.4 2.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 2.2
Banking 4.1 5.4 1.2 2.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 2.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 1.0 3.1 3.2 5.2 0.1 0.1 3.1 5.1
Manufacturing -1.8 -0.1 -0.5 1.2 0.1 0.1 -0.6 1.1
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -1.7 0.3 -0.6 1.2 0.1 0.1 -0.7 1.2
Electricity, gas and water supply -0.2 1.4 -0.2 1.4 0.1 0.1 -0.3 1.4
Construction 0.0 2.1 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 4.2 6.1 2.7 4.5 0.1 0.1 2.6 4.4
Hotels and restaurants 7.2 7.4 -0.2 0.6 1.3 0.8 -1.4 -0.2
Other land transport 2.8 3.6 -0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.6
Auxiliary transport activities 2.8 3.6 -0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.6
Post and courier activities 2.8 3.6 -0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.6
Real estate and professional services 1.5 3.5 -0.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 -0.5 1.3
Public administration and defence 0.3 1.5 -0.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 1.3
Education -0.5 1.6 -0.9 1.0 0.0 0.1 -1.0 0.9
Health and social work -0.2 1.9 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.9
Other social and personal services 0.1 1.9 -0.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 -0.4 1.3












Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways -0.4
Transport via pipelines -0.4
Air transport -23.3 -29.0 -20.7
Telecommunications -1.3 -1.5 -1.2
Insurance -4.6 -4.6 0.7
Banking -1.2 -1.2 0.9
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying -0.5 -0.5 -1.6
Manufacturing 10.9 -3.0 14.6
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 60.3 -22.2 60.3
Electricity, gas and water supply -2.1
Construction -1.9
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants -2.5
Other land transport -2.8
Auxiliary transport activities -2.8
Post and courier activities -2.8
Real estate and professional services -0.1
Public administration and defence -3.4
Education -0.7
Health and social work -2.3
Other social and personal services -1.6
Source: Authors' estimates.  
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Table 11: Impacts on Exports from Unilateral Liberalization   
(% change from benchmark) 
European 
Union CIS
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 2.8
Transport via pipelines 2.8
Air transport -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Telecommunications 3.7 3.7 3.7
Insurance -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
Banking 1.1 1.1 1.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 2.0 2.0 2.0
Manufacturing 9.3 9.3 9.3
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.5
Construction 2.0
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 13.1
Other land transport 7.0
Auxiliary transport activities 7.0
Post and courier activities 7.0
Real estate and professional services 2.8
Public administration and defence 3.9
Education -0.3
Health and social work 1.8
Other social and personal services 2.4
Source: Authors' estimates.  53 
 





Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 1.5
Transport via pipelines 1.5
Air transport -17.1 175.2 25.7 247.8
Telecommunications 2.6 1.9 3.1
Insurance -5.7 13.1 13.1 29.6
Banking -0.8 5.3 5.3 11.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -1.2
Manufacturing -1.6 6.0 -4.8 8.8
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction




Post and courier activities
Real estate and professional services
Public administration and defence
Education
Health and social work
Other social and personal services
Source: Authors' estimates.  54 
 
 
Table 13: Impacts on Imports from EU-CIS FTA (% change from benchmark) 
European 
Union CIS
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 1.7
Transport via pipelines 1.7
Air transport -4.1 -14.8 -16.6
Telecommunications 1.4 1.1 1.3
Insurance -0.7 -0.7 -8.0
Banking 2.2 2.2 -0.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 9.6 8.9 31.4
Manufacturing 44.0 2.1 -4.3
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 126.5 8.3 6.7
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.4
Construction 2.5
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 0.5
Other land transport 2.1
Auxiliary transport activities 2.1
Post and courier activities 2.1
Real estate and professional services 4.4
Public administration and defence 1.5
Education 4.3
Health and social work 2.7
Other social and personal services 2.5
Source: Authors' estimates.  55 
 
Table 14: Impacts on Exports from EU-CIS FTA (% change from benchmark) 
European 
Union CIS
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways -0.7
Transport via pipelines -0.7
Air transport -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
Telecommunications -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Insurance -5.1 -5.1 -5.1
Banking -3.0 -3.0 -3.0
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 19.6 14.0 14.0
Manufacturing 37.0 11.1 11.1
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 17.8 5.4 5.4
Electricity, gas and water supply -3.4
Construction -2.4
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants -0.6
Other land transport -2.1
Auxiliary transport activities -2.1
Post and courier activities -2.1
Real estate and professional services -3.9
Public administration and defence -1.6
Education -5.1
Health and social work -2.3
Other social and personal services -3.8
Source: Authors' estimates.  
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Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0.5
Transport via pipelines 0.5
Air transport -9.5 311.2 33.4 -32.8
Telecommunications 2.0 0.3 1.5
Insurance -6.1 14.8 14.8 -12.5
Banking -1.8 6.2 6.2 -2.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 2.8 7.1 6.6 23.4
Manufacturing -0.5 31.2 -0.8 -5.8
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction




Post and courier activities
Real estate and professional services
Public administration and defence
Education
Health and social work
Other social and personal services
Source: Authors' estimates.  57 
 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0.0
Transport via pipelines 0.0
Air transport -2.2 -1.4 -2.2
Telecommunications -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Insurance -5.8 -0.4 -7.3
Banking -1.7 0.3 -2.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.1
Manufacturing 3.2 3.2 3.3
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0
Electricity, gas and water supply -0.2
Construction -0.1
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants -0.6
Other land transport -0.2
Auxiliary transport activities -0.2
Post and courier activities -0.2
Real estate and professional services 0.0
Public administration and defence -0.3
Education 0.0
Health and social work 0.0
Other social and personal services -0.1
Source: Authors' estimates.  58 
 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0.2
Transport via pipelines 0.2
Air transport 0.3 0.3 0.3
Telecommunications 0.6 0.6 0.6
Insurance -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Banking 0.4 0.4 0.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 0.1 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.1 0.1 0.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.4
Construction 0.1
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 2.4
Other land transport 0.5
Auxiliary transport activities 0.5
Post and courier activities 0.5
Real estate and professional services 0.2
Public administration and defence 0.4
Education 0.1
Health and social work 0.1
Other social and personal services 0.2
Source: Authors' estimates.  59 
 
Table 18: Impacts on Number of Firms from CIS Preferential Services Agreement (% 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0.1
Transport via pipelines 0.1
Air transport -0.9 -3.7 40.8 -4.5
Telecommunications 0.2 0.4 0.2
Insurance -3.5 -4.8 17.0 -9.3
Banking -0.5 -1.1 6.2 -2.3
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Manufacturing 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction




Post and courier activities
Real estate and professional services
Public administration and defence
Education
Health and social work
Other social and personal services
Source: Authors' estimates.  60 
 
 
Table 19: Impacts on Imports from EU FTA (% change from benchmark) 
European 
Union CIS
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 1.6
Transport via pipelines 1.6
Air transport -2.1 -14.2 -15.1
Telecommunications 1.5 1.1 1.4
Insurance 5.2 -0.4 -1.1
Banking 3.9 1.9 2.0
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 9.6 8.9 31.3
Manufacturing 43.9 2.1 -4.4
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 126.5 8.3 6.7
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.6
Construction 2.6
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 1.1
Other land transport 2.3
Auxiliary transport activities 2.3
Post and courier activities 2.3
Real estate and professional services 4.4
Public administration and defence 1.9
Education 4.3
Health and social work 2.7
Other social and personal services 2.5
Source: Authors' estimates.  61 
 
Table 20: Impacts on Exports from EU FTA (% change from benchmark) 
European 
Union CIS
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways -0.9
Transport via pipelines -0.9
Air transport -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
Telecommunications -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Insurance -4.1 -4.1 -4.1
Banking -3.3 -3.3 -3.3
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 19.6 13.9 13.9
Manufacturing 36.8 10.9 10.9
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 17.6 5.3 5.3
Electricity, gas and water supply -3.8
Construction -2.5
Wholesale, retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants -2.9
Other land transport -2.5
Auxiliary transport activities -2.5
Post and courier activities -2.5
Real estate and professional services -4.0
Public administration and defence -2.0
Education -5.2
Health and social work -2.5
Other social and personal services -4.0
Source: Authors' estimates.  62 
 




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Transport via railways 0.4
Transport via pipelines 0.4
Air transport -8.7 328.8 -10.7 -30.6
Telecommunications 1.9 0.0 1.4
Insurance -2.8 20.6 -2.1 -4.1
Banking -1.3 7.5 0.0 0.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining and quarrying 2.7 7.1 6.6 23.3
Manufacturing -0.5 31.1 -0.8 -5.9
Other goods and services
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction




Post and courier activities
Real estate and professional services
Public administration and defence
Education
Health and social work
Other social and personal services
Source: Authors' estimates.  63 
 
 
Table 22: Piecemeal Sensitivity of impact on Armenia of a DCFTA with the EU 
  Results are estimated changes in welfare (Hicksian EV) as a percent of 
consumption  
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
˃(qi, qj) –  services sectors 2 3 4 1.39 1.44 1.51
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 1.76 1.44 1.30
˃(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 1.39 1.44 1.52
˃(D, M) 2 4 6 1.42 1.44 1.46
˃(M, M) 4 8 12 1.44 1.44 1.44
˃(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 1.44 1.44 1.44
˃(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 1.44 1.45
˃(D, E) 2 4 6 1.44 1.44 1.44
ʵARM 1.46 1.44 1.43
ʵEU 0.96 1.44 1.77
ʵCIS 1.44 1.44 1.45
ʵROW 1.53 1.44 1.39
θr  NA 0 1 NA 1.44 1.37
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.73 0.67
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 1.44 1.44 1.45
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Mining & quarrying 8.5 17.00 25.5






Central values of all 4 sets of  ʵ
parameters are listed in table 6B.
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
˃(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
˃(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
˃(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic production and imports
˃(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
˃(M, M): Elasticity of substitution between imported varieties
˃(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
˃(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
ʵARM: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵEU: Elasticity of EU service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵCIS: Elasticity of CIS service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents




Table 23: Piecemeal Sensitivity of impact on Armenia preferential services liberalization 
with the CIS region   
Results are estimated changes in welfare (Hicksian EV) as a percent of 
consumption 
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
˃(qi, qj) –  services sectors 2 3 4 0.22 0.10 0.07
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 0.11 0.10 0.10
˃(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.09 0.10 0.12
˃(D, M) 2 4 6 0.10 0.10 0.10
˃(M, M) 4 8 12 0.10 0.10 0.10
˃(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 0.10 0.10 0.10
˃(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 0.10 0.10
˃(D, E) 2 4 6 0.10 0.10 0.10
ʵARM 0.11 0.10 0.10
ʵEU 0.11 0.10 0.10
ʵCIS 0.05 0.10 0.15
ʵROW 0.11 0.10 0.10
θr  NA 0 1 NA 0.10 0.01
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.06 -0.03
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 0.10 0.10 0.10
˃(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Mining & quarrying 8.5 17.00 25.5






Central values of all 4 sets of  ʵ
parameters are listed in table 6B.
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
˃(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
˃(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
˃(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic production and imports
˃(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
˃(M, M): Elasticity of substitution between imported varieties
˃(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
˃(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
ʵARM: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵEU: Elasticity of EU service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵCIS: Elasticity of CIS service firm supply with respect to price of output
ʵROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents
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Figure 2:  Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Output 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The 
vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 67 
 
Figure 3:   Means 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Labor 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The 
vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 68 
 








































Figure 5: Means 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Output 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The 
vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 70 
 
Figure 6: Means 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the Labor 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The 
vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 
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Appendix A: Trade Data and Tariff Rates for Armenia’s Trade Partners 
 
Trade Data by Regional Partner and Sector 
 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we used trade data 
published by the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia
21. The data is for the year 2007 and 
shows exports and imports by country and commodity.  
  The regions of our model are Armenia, the European Union, the CIS, and the Rest of the World. For 
the European Union, we took the 27 member countries as of 2007. For the CIS, we include Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Rest of the World is the residual.  
The data is reported according to the Harmonized System (HS) classification at the two digit level. 
We mapped the HS-commodities into the sectors of our model. The exact mapping is defined in the first 
table below.  Results for both exports and imports are reported in the subsequent two tables. 
Tariff Data. 
We use detailed collected tariff data from the Armenian Customs Authority.  That is, we received 
data on collected import duties (tariffs) and import values at the four digit tariff line level (again using the 
Harmonized System classification). The collected tariff rates for the sectors in our model are obtained by 
first aggregating the four digit tariff line level tariff collections and import values to the sectors of our 
model. The ratio of tariff collections to import values for each sector of our model is then calculated to give 
estimates of the collected tariff rates, which in turn are incorporated into our dataset. The tariff rates are 
shown in Table 4. Applying these tariff rates across all sectors implies that tariff revenue in the revised 
database is about 1% of GDP, which is consistent with collected revenues in Armenia.
22   
Given that Armenia participates in preferential trade areas with the other CIS member states, it 
was necessary to make further adjustments. That is, since, in principle, tariff rates should be zero within 
these preferential trade areas, we set tariff collections on imports from CIS countries at zero. We then 
increased the tariff rates for the other regions in our model so that the overall weighted average collected 
tariff rate is unchanged. We used the trade flow data, disaggregated by regions and sectors of our model to 
weight the tariff rates. This adjustment has the impact of raising the collected tariff rates for the regions in 
our model where positive tariff rates apply. The resulting adjusted tariff rates are also reported in Table 4. 
 
                                                           
21 http://www.armstat.am/file/article/ft_2nish_07_14.pdf 
22 For the year 2008, aggregate data from Armenia show that tariff collections are 1% of GDP.  73 
  
Table 1 Correspondences between sectors of the model and two digit HS Classification 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery  1-10 
Mining and quarrying  25-27 
Manufacturing  11-24, 28-97 
Source: Authors' estimates.  
 





Rest of the 
World 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery  15057  92032  127837 
Mining and quarrying  145367  272520  98488 
Manufacturing  753763  406486  1356241 
Source: Authors' calculations from data provided by the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.  
 





Rest of the 
World 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery  3192  5068  16640 
Mining and quarrying  72795  2340  98404 
Manufacturing  317146  208070  428649 
Source: Authors' calculations from data provided by the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.  
 







Rest of the 
World 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishery  5.2  8.5  0  8.5 
Mining and quarrying  0  0  0  0 
Manufacturing  3.2  3.8  0  3.8 
Source: Authors' calculations from data provided by the Armenian Customs Authority.  
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Appendix B: 
Market Shares by Region in Key Services Sectors in Armenia 
 
Karine Eroyants, Consultant 
karine_eroyants@yahoo.com  
 
To obtain data on market shares of the business services sectors in the Armenia CGE model we explored all 
the available sourses and prepare the data by key region in Armenia. These are: Armenia, CIS less Armenia, 
the EU, the USA and the Rest of the World (RoW).  Collected data is  based on the market shares of services 
firms that have a domestic presence in Armenia, mostly focusing on the following sectors: Banking and 
Credit Organazations, Insurance, Telecommunication sector, Air transportation, Railroad Transportation,  
and Pipeline  sectors.  As shows results in the table below more than half of ownership shares are being 
held by representatives from CIS coutries, mostly by Russian Federation, which has very significant 
participation in several  sectors. Russian “South Caucasus Railways” has monopoly rights fully controlling 
railway transportation in Armenia, russian “ Gazprom” is taking 80 % shares of gas pipeline's, in addition 
having  about 40% in telecomunication service sector.  









Documentation of the Calculation of Ownership Shares for Armenia 
Market shares in percent
ARM CIS EU USA ROW
Banking and other financial sector 25,97 36,17 15,59 10,12 12,15 100
Insurance 31,2 38,87 20,3 8,45 1,18 100
Telecomunicaion sector 0 38,96 5,73 31,7 23,61 100
Air transportation services 70,42 8,73 8,73 0 12,12 100
Pipeline transportation services 20 78 2 0 0 100
Railroad Transportation 0 100 0 0 0 100
Total shares by regions 147,59 300,73 52,35 50,27 49,06 60075 
I. Bank Shares in Armenia 
Bank Market Shares 
The data source concerning to banks was the financial-banking portal www.armbanks.am, the 
leading Internet edition in Armenia covering the countries financial and banking sectors,
1 exploring 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/ for banks information and http://www.armbanks.am/en/credit-
companies/ for credit organizations (CO).   
Through the portal I obtained data on total assets by bank and credit organizations (CO) in Armenia, 
owners-shareholders of the bank and the percent of the bank owned by each owner-shareholder. 
After collecting data I defined the market share of each bank and CO as a share of total bank and 
CO assets in the country. Then I divided the regions into Armenia (ARM), CIS, the European Union 
(EU), USA, and the Rest of the World (RoW) to calculate the market shares by region.  
Ownership Shares of Banks 
Each bank’s market share was then allocated among geographic regions according to the shares of 
ownership of the bank. Then I summed across the banks to obtain total market shares by region. However, 
in some cases, I had to investigate bank websites to get the required ownership information. In the Table 1, 
I list the result of these calculations. The results of our supplementary inquiries are listed below 
The  results we  get on  the  owners  shares  of  the  banking  sector of  Armenia  are  as  follows  (in 
percent): Armenia, 25.98; CIS, 36.17; EU, 15.59; USA 10.12; ROW 12.15, (see Table 1).    
 
Supplementary Information on Ownership Shares of Armenian Banks 
1.  ACBA-Cedit Agricole CJSC: The ACBA bank was established in 1996, within TACIS program of the 
European Union. On September 15, 2006 European leading French Credit Agricole bank became the 
biggest shareholder of ACBA Bank, becoming a closed joint stock company and it was renamed 
ACBA-CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK. The shareholders are Credit Agricole Group (France) – 15.56%, JSC 
Sacam International (France) – 12.44%, Armenian regional farm unions particularly: Armavir - 
14.08% and Ararat 12.28%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=3&lang=en, 
http://acba.am/index.php 
2.  Ameriabank CJSC:The bank was established in 1910 as a branch of Caucasian Trade Bank, which 
during the Soviet years was transformed to the Armenian branch of the USSR Vneshtorgbank. In 
July 1992, Armenian Import-Export Bank CJSC was founded, which received a banking license from 
the Central Bank of Armenia on September 8 of the same year. In August 2007, the main share 
holdings of the Bank (96%) were obtained by TDA Holdings Limited, an investment company 
affiliated with the leading and largest Russian investment group company – Troika Dialog. In 2007-
2008, gradually increasing the Charter Capital of the Bank, the major shareholder TDA Holdings 
Limited increased its equity participation up to 99.9956044%. TDA Holdings Limited - 99.99%  
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=4&lang=en, http://www.ameriabank.am/23 
1.  Araratbank OJSC: ARARATBANK was established as a result of the reorganization of Haykap Bank, 
operating on Armenian financial market since 1991. ARARATBANK has been functioning as an open 
joint stock company since August 2007. The bank is a shareholder and a full member of "Armenian 
Card" company since 2006. The shareholders are Flesh Ltd - 74.1%, EBRD - 25%, Resident 
                                                           
23   Apart from on-line information the www.armbanks.am portal offers also analytical research, exclusive stories and information about 
banks, insurance and credit organizations, their comparative financial indices as well as statistical data. 76 
Individuals 0.9%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=6&lang=en, 
http://www.araratbank.am/ 
 
2.  Ardshininvestbank was registered by the decision of the RA Central Bank Board (license N 83) in 
2003. Acquired a significant part of assets and liabilities, as well as wide branch network. The main 
shareholders are Business Investment Center LLC 86.96%, International Financial Corporation 
10.00%, and Resident Individuals 3.04%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=7&lang=en, 
www.ashib.am 
3.  Areximbank: Areximbank-Gazprombank Group was founded in August 1998 to support 
entrepreneurship and manage the financial flows between Russia and Armenia. Since September 
2008 Gazprombank is 100% owner of the bank. The shareholders of Gazprombank are as follows: 
Zao Leader (On Behalf Of Gazfond) - 42.89%, Joint Stock Company 'Gazprom – 41.73%, Treasury 
Stock -8.21%, Negosudarstvennyi Pensionnyi Fond Gazfond – 7.11%, Individuals – 0.06% 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=8&lang=en, www.areximbank.am 
4.  Armbusinessbank: was established as shareholding bank “Arminvestbank” in 1991. Chrystie 
Management owned 86.99% shares Armbusinessbank, while the remaining 13.01% is owned 
Ukrprombank, who intends to sell all the shares (13,01%) of the company Chrystie 
Management.Gasprombank OJSC  http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=12&lang=en, 
www.armbusinessbank.am 
5.  Armeconombank: OAO «Armeconombank» registered in 1991. 75% of its shares owned by the 
founders of "Sil" group - the family business Sukiasyans and the rest 25% are owned by EBRD. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=17&lang=en,http://www.aeb.am/ 
6.  Armenian Development Bank is one of the first commercial banks in Armenia. The bank was 
established in 1990 under the rule of former Soviet Union Prime Minister N. Rizhkov. The Bank’s 
legal status is Open Joint Stock Company (OJSC).The government does not have a share in Bank’s 
capital. The resident individuals’ and jurisdictional entities’ contribution to the statutory fund 
makes up 52.057% and non-resident individuals’ and jurisdictional entities’ contribution to the 
statutory fund makes up 47.94%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=2&lang=en, 
www.armdb.com 
7.  Armswissbank was registered November 22, 2004 with 100% Swiss capital, and February 25, 2005 
received a license № 84 of the Central Bank to conduct banking activities. The 100% owner is 
Vardan Sirmakes from Switzerland. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=18&lang=en, 
www.armswissbank.am  
8.  Artsakhbank, CJSC was established on February 12, 1996 (the RA Central Bank’s License No.75 of 
July 14, 1996) The shareholders are Vardan Sirmakes (CH) 43,13%, Hratch K. Gabrielyan (US) 
44,08%, Non-resident Individuals 5,10%, Resident Individuals and Legal Entities  7,69% 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=19&lang=en, www.ab.am 
9.  “Anelik Bank” CJSC was founded in 1990 August 1, by enterprises and organizations of Light 
Industry as a Shareholding Commercial Bank. In 2007 “Anelik Bank” LTD was reorganizaed into 
Closed Joint Stock Company. “Anelik Bank” CJSC is a universal commercial bank, which has an active 
participation in the social-economical area of the country. The shareholders are CreditBank S.A.L. 
(LB) 51% and physical persons (AM) 49%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=5&lang=en, 
www.anelik.am 
10. CJSC "BTA Bank" is a strategic partner of one of the largest banks in Kazakhstan JSC "BTA Bank", 
which owns 48.9% stake in the Armenian "BTA Bank". The other shareholders are the Austrian 
company ZRL (with share of 31.1%) and the Kazakh-Armenian company MOBILEX (16.3%) 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=20&lang=en,  www.bta.am 
11. "Byblos Bank": In 2007 the Lebanese "Byblos Bank" Chevron-El ("Byblos Bank" SAL) became the 
major shareholder of the Armenian CJSC "ITB" International Trade Bank with 65% of the shares, 
then the bank was renamed the Byblos Bank Armenia. The other shareholders are the EBRD with 
25% stake and the International Fund for Development OPEC - with 10% stake. 77 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=21&lang=en, http://www.byblosbankarmenia.am/                                                                               
 
12. Cascade Bank was founded in 2005 after Cascade Capital Holdings acquired 100 percent shares of 
Emporiki Bank (Armenia). On March 31 Cascade Capital Holdings and TDA Holdings Ltd, the 
shareholders of Cascade Bank and Ameriabank signed a merger agreement. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=22&lang=en, www.cch.am 
13. Converse Bank created in 1993 as a "North -Armenian" joint stock Bank. In 1997 reconstructed to 
"Converse Bank" Closed Joint Stock Company. The main shareholder is Advanced Global 
Investments LLC (US) with 95%, the rest is owned by The Armenian Saint Apostolic Church (5%). 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=23&lang=en, www.conversebank.am 
14. HSBC Bank Armenia was established as a closed joint stock company under the name Midland 
Armenia Bank J.S.C. in 1996 and has been renamed into HSBC Bank Armenia cjsc in 1999. The bank 
is a joint venture between the HSBC Group, which has a 70% ownership, and members of overseas 
Armenian businesses with 30% ownership (Wings Establishment, Liechtenstein). 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=25&lang=en, www.hsbc.am 
15. INECOBANK CJSC was registered on February 7, 1996 (banking license number 68 issued by the 
Central Bank of Armenia). INECOBANK’s Profile: International audit: since 1998 (by KPMG). First 
Armenian bank which introduced Point of Sales lending program. The significant participants are 
Armenian physical persons with 76.50% share, Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft 
with 13.50%, and the IFC with 10 % of share. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=26&lang=en, www.inecobank.am 
16. Mellat Bank, Yerevan was established in the R.A based on the mutual agreement on Cooperation, 
friendship and good neighborhood announced between the R.A and the I.R.I on 1995. Bank Mellat 
of Iran is a state owned commercial bank and is 100% shareholder of Mellat Bank, Yerevan. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=28&lang=en, www.mellatbank.am 
17. ProCredit Bank: The Central Bank of Armenia granted ProCredit Bank license to conduct banking 
operations in Armenia on December 7, 2007. The shareholders of ProCredit Bank are ProCredit 
Holding AG with the 66.66% of shares, KfW with 16.67% of shares, and EBRD with 16.67% of shares. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=30&lang=en, www.procreditbank.am 
18. Prometey Bank commercial bank was founded in 1990 and renamed into "Prometey Bank" Limited 
Liability Company in 2001. The main participants are ZNGS-Prometey CJSC with 92.25% share and 
Armenian physical person. http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=32&lang=en,  
www.prometeybank.am 
19. Unibank CJSC was founded in October 2001 with an authorized capital of $ 5, its shareholders are 
Ripatonso Holdings Limited (75.43%), and physical persons from RF (24.57%). 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/banks/?org=35&lang=en, http://www.unibank-armenia.com/ 
20. VTB Bank Armenia: the Bank`s 100% shareholder is "VTB Bank" OJSC. 







II. Armenian Insurance Companies 78 
The source of data for Armenian insurance companies was the financial-banking portal 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/. From this information agency the list of Armenian 
active insurance companies was obtained. In addition I found all required information about 
shareholders, market shares and total assets. After collecting data I divided the regions into Armenia 
(AM), CIS, the European Union (EU), USA, and the Rest of the World (RoW) to calculate the 
market shares by region.  
The results for market share owners of the Insurance sector in Armenia are as follows Armenia – 31.20 %, 
CIS – 38.88%, EU – 20.30%, US – 8.45%, RoW – 1.18%. Detailed results are listed in Table 2. 
 
Supplementary Information on Ownership Shares of Armenian Insurance Companies  
1.  Alfa Insurance   "Alfa Insurance" Insurance Company was founded in 2008: founders are STIVENS 
INVEST and FAYNENS S.A. (50%) and NORLIN ASSETS Investment Companies Inc. (50%). 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=60&lang=en,www.alfa-insurance.am 
2.  Cascade Insurance Company CJSC (CIRCO) is a subsidiary of Cascade Capital Holdings, which in turn 
is 65% owned by the Cafesjian Family Foundation, a United States organization. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development purchased a 35% equity share in August 2005. This is the only EBRD 
investment into the insurance sector in Armenia. http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-
market/?org=62&lang=en, www.cascadeinsurance.am 
3.  Garant-Limens CJSC was registered on Feb. 2, 1999. А significant shareholder of the company is Ara 
Babloyan with 27,4% of shares. http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-
market/?org=63&lang=en, www.glinsurance.am 
4.  Griar  Insurance  Company’s  100%  shareholder  is  LLC  Ches  TOR  (Russia) 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=64&lang=en, www.griar-insurance.am 
5.  Ingo Armenia CJSC was founded in 1997 as an insurance company “EFES”. In December 2003, 75% 
of the shares of the company was bought by Russian Insurance AO Ingosstrakh, after which the 
company was renamed "INGO ARMENIA" Insurance CJSC. Today, the main shareholder of the company 
is Invest-Policy CJSC "with 75% of the shares and Levon Altunian with 25% share. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=85&lang=en, www.ingoarmenia.am 
6.  ISG Ltd was registered on Dec. 25, 2007. A 100% shareholder of the company is "Mika Limited” 
(UK). http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=65&lang=en,  www.isg.am 
7.  London-Yerevan Co was registered as insurance Ltd. in 1998. Commercial activities "London-
Yerevan Co has launched since February 2000. 100% shareholder of the company is "Londongeyt 
Investment and Menedzhmentnd Pi-E-C" (UK). http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-
market/?org=80&lang=en, www.london-yerevan.com   
8.  Ltd. Nairi Insurance was established in December 1996, and insurance activities launched since 
April 1997. It belongs to Levon Kocharyan (Armenia) - 30%, Hovik Shahinyan (Armenia) - 22.5%, Vahan 
Gabrielyan (Armenia) - 22.5%, Vahagn Shahinyan (Armenia) - 12.5%, Vahagn Khachatryan (Armenia) - 
12.5%. http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=81&lang=en, www.nairi-insurance.am 
9.  "Rasco" Ltd. was created August 30, 2004. Today shareholders are Investment Financial 
Corporation “Region” CJSC with a share 94.83% and E. Arabhanyan (Armenia) - 5.17%. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=82&lang=en, www.rasco.am 
10. JSC "Reso" was registered in 2008 as the Company "Yunireso”. The company was renamed "Reso" 
in 2009. The founders of the company is "Polygraphy" CJSC - Gagik Zakarian Tigranovich, co-owner of 
“Uniastrum Bank”, "Unibank" with a share of 50%, and "CIS Equity Partners Limited” Ltd - Sarkisov 
Sergey, CJSC “RESO-Garantia" owner with the rest 50%.Thus, RESO is a "daughter" of the most reliable 
insurance companies in Russia. http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=86&lang=en, 
www.reso.am 
11. Rosgosstrakh - Armenia was established in May 2008, by an investment holding company “RGS 79 
Assets Limited” (100% stake). In April 2010 Rosgosstrakh became 100% shareholder of Rosgosstrakh – 
Armenia. http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=61&lang=en, www.rgs.am 
12. “Sil Insurance" was registered in March 1, 2000. Shareholders are Sukiasyans family (4 
shareholders, Armenia) with 80% stake and "Armeconombank" Ltd. 
http://www.armbanks.am/en/insurance-market/?org=83&lang=en, www.silinsurance.am 
 
III. Telecommunications Shares in Armenia 
 
The primary source of data was from websites of domestic telecommunication companies and severalweb 
sites which provide worldwide information on telecommunication 24. I defined market share as the share 
of total subscribers, summing up fixed-line and mobile subscribers. Then I calculated obtained shares by 
regions. Table 3 contains mobile phone subscription statistics by company and the number of fixed-line 
phone subscribers, shareholders %, and market shares by regions. 
The results for market share owners of the telecomunication sector in Armenia are as follows Armenia – 0 
%, CIS – 38.96%, EU – 5,73%, US – 31,7%, RoW – 23,61%.  
 
Supplementary Information on Ownership Shares of Armenian Telecommunications Companies 
ArmenTel CJSC (brand Beeline): The Armenia Telephone Company is the largest telecommunications 
company in Armenia. Its 100% belongs to the second largest Russian mobile network operator VimpelCom 
(brand Beeline) since 2006. ArmenTel is the second largest taxpayer of Armenia (e.g. in the year 2005 15.3 
billion Dram, converted approximately 28 millions euro). Armentel provides 100% of fixed line service, and 
19.36% out of mobile services in Armenia. http:///www.beeline.am 
K-Telecom CJSC (trading as VivaCell-MTS) is a subsidiary of Russian powerhouse Mobile TeleSystems OJSC 
a leading telecoms operator in Russia and CIS countries, which owns 80% of shares of company, the 
remaining 20% owned by the Lebanese investment group Fattouch Group.  VivaCell-MTS controlled 73.53 
% of the domestic mobile market as at 31 December 2009 
http://www.vivacell.am  
Orange Armenia is 100% daughter of France Telecom (brand name Orange), entered the 
Armenian market from 5-th November 2009, providing 83% network coverage and access to 
mobile networks and the Internet in 500 communities (cities and villages) of the republic. By the 
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IV. Pipeline Transportation 
Gas Companies 
 
Today in Armenia there are two gas pipeline - from Georgia and from Iran. Armenia has no proven reserves 
of oil or natural gas and currently imports nearly all of it from Russia.  
Russia-Georgia-Armenia pipelines 
The Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom supplies Armenia with gas through a pipeline that runs through 
Georgia. In 2007, Gazprom provided Armenia with just under 2 billion cubic meters of natural gas. As a 
transit fee, Armenia pays Georgia approximately 10% of the gas that was destined to reach Armenia. 
Russian natural gas supplies to Georgia and Armenia are provided by two main pipelines: the North 
Caucasus-Transcaucasus pipeline (1,200 mm diameter) and the Mozdok-Tbilisi pipeline (700 mm diameter). 
In 2008, Armenia imported 2.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia.
25 
Iran-Armenia pipeline 
A new gas pipeline, the Iran-Armenia Natural Gas Pipeline, was completed in October, 2008. It is owned 
and operated by ArmRosGazProm and links Armenia to neighboring Iran, which has the world's second 
largest natural gas reserve after Russia. It has a capacity to pump 2.3-2.5 billion cubic meters of Iranian gas 
per year.  
In 2009 Armenia was importing 1-1.5 million cubic meters of Iranian natural gas, paying for this by 
electricity exports.  
 
ArmRosGazprom (ARG) was founded in 1997 as a joint Russian-Armenian natural gas pipeline project. In 
April 2006, Gazprom and Armenia signed a contract for 25 years about strategic principles of cooperation in 
gas and energy projects in the Armenian territory. The company is the owner of the whole gas transmission 
and distribution system of the Republic of Armenia organizing the gas supply for Armenia's domestic gas 
market. The ARG organizes the gas supply for Armenia's domestic gas market. ARG buys the gas at the 
border from Gazexport, an export unit of Gazprom, and distributes it through the ARG pipeline, mainly to 
the domestic market.  The company is registered in Armenia as Closed Joint Stock Company and when it 
was founded, the Russian state gas monopolist Gazprom owned 45% of stock, the Armenian Energy 
Ministry 45% and the ITERA company 10%.26  In March 2009 former ownership  ITERA International Energy 
L.L.C sold it's  nominal shares to Gazprom OSC. 
As at 31.12.2009  Gazprom OSC owns 80% of shares and the rest 20% is under control of  Ministry of Energy 
of RA. At the same time the Russian government controls 50.002 percent of shares in Gazprom through 
Rosimushchestvo (38.373%), Rosneftegaz (10.740%), and Rosgazifikatsiya (0.889%). The rest of shares are 
allocateed between American Depositary Receipts (ADR)  holders 24.350% and other registered entities 
(25.648%) as at 31.12.2009.  
                                                           
25  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_in_Armenia 
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V. Maritime Transportation 
The Republic of Armenia is under unilateral transport isolation by its two neighboring countries: Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. The nearest seaport is Poti in Georgia, through which Armenia gets access to the countries of 
the Black Sea region.  
 
 
VI. Air transport infrastructure 
 
Civil aviation infrastructure consists of two international airports: "Zvartnots" and "Gyumri", and nine local 
(non-military) airports.  
Armenia International airport “Zvartnots” is under the management of CJSC “Armenia - International 
Airports”. The 100% owner of the company is Argentinean Company “American International Airports”, which 
belongs to the citizen of Argentine of Armenian origin Eduardo Eurnekian.27  
Today about 28 aircompanies are serving Armenia: BMI - "BRITISH MIDLANDAIRWAYS LIMITED", 
Armenian Branch (UK), Aeroflot -Russian Airlines (Russia), Austrian Airlines (Austria), Czech Airlines (Czech 
Republic), Armavia (Armenia), Air France (France), Siberia Airlines (Russia), Air Arabia (UAE), etc.  
13 domestic airlines have received licenses for flight operations and currently perform scheduled as well as 
non-scheduled flights.The following Air Companies have obtained Certificates of Operator from the General 
Department of Civil Aviation of RA: "Armavia" Aviacompany LLC, “Atlantis European Airways” LLC, “South 
Airlines” LLC, “Hayk Avia” Aircompany CJSC, “Air Armenia” CJSC, “Reliable uniqe service aviation” LLC, 
“Phoenix Avia” LLC, “Ararat International airlines” LLC, “Taron-Avia” LLC, “Vertir” LLC, “Air Highnesses” LLC, 
“V-Berd Avia” LLC, “Ark airways” LLC,  “Veteran Avia” LLC 
28 . 
The leading company Armavia Air Company LLC is the national air carrier of Armenia. Armavia was 
established in 1996 replacing the old Armenia Airlines on flights to Europe, Middle East and CIS routes and.  
In 2005 the full package of shares was transferred to Mikhail Baghdasarov, President of the company “Mika 
Armenia Trading”. Armavia is a member of the International Association of Air Transport (IATA). The carrier 
is based in Zvartnots Airport, Yerevan Armavia operates over 102 flights to 35 destinations in 20 countries 
every week. The company flew 700,000 passengers, which is 47,64% out of  volume of passenger transport 
(1469,3 th.man) in 2009. 
 
                                                           
27  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zvartnots_International_Airport 
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Armavia has the right to conduct air passenger transportation from Armenia, while the other air companies 
do not have such a right. They carry freight from Armenia, for example, "Air of Armenia", which operates 
flights to Europe, but has no right to carry passengers. 
Companies engaged in cargo transportation are rather big - they have 4-5 large cargo aircraft IL-76.
29  
Air Armenia  is possessing cargo airplanes and operating cargo flights from 
Armenia to the rest of the world. This company operates regular flights twice a week 
from Yerevan to Frankfurt (Hahn) and from Frankfurt to any other destination. Air 
Armenia is a private airline established in 2003 and based at Yerevan Zvartnots 
Airport in Armenia (EVN, UGEE).
30 
 
The most challenging was to obtain data on air transportation in Armenia. Through 
National Statistical Service of RA we got the total air passenger and cargo traffic data 
for 2009 in Armenia. (8,4 th. Tons of cargo freight and 1496,3 th. Man). Majority of 
armenian air companies do not have web-sites and did not provide any private 
information. Only the national carrier of Armenia Armavia publicly report 
information on its air traffic. The company flew 700,000 passengers, which is 
47,64% out of  volume of passenger transport in 2009. 
So,  We define the share of airline in passenger carrying market by a company share in total passenger 
turnover, the same for the cargo carrying market. To derive the total market share we put weights to be 
equal 50% for passenger and 50% for cargo carrying market. 
As the only Armavia has the right to conduct air passenger transportation from Armenia, we assume that 
the rest of market share (52,36%) refers to  foreign air companies mentioned above. Unfortunately there is 
no public available information of passenger allocation among foreign companies. So we allocate  equally 
33,33%  to CIS, EU, and ROW region in the same amount (8,73%), and rescale the total to be equal 100%.  
In 2009 the leader of cargo flights Air Armenia served 4,6 th. tons or 54,76% of cargo carrying. Unfortunatly 
there is no any information conserning domestic cargo flights aircompanies. Several of them have started 
to operate in 2010, so we just allocated the rest of market shares. After rescaling the results for market 
share by regions (in percent) are as follows:  
ARM 70.43%, CIS 8.73%, EU 8.73%, ROW 12.12%. 
 
 
VII. Railroad Transportation 
Since Armenia does not have a direct exit to the sea and located in mountains 1800 meters high above the 
sea level, the railway transportation has an important strategic value in maintenance with the reliable 
transport communication promoting economic and social development of the Republic. 
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Joint-Stock Company "SCR": “South Caucasus Railways” CJSC is 100% subsidiary of Russian Railways OJSC. 
Armenian Railways OJSC was transferred to the SCR CJSC under a concession agreement signed on February 
13, 2008.
31  
So, we infer 100 % ownership to CIS.
                                                           





Table 1:    Armenia Banks'  Ownership Shares, by Region
No Shareholders (ISO Country Code) Market shares by regions, %
ARM CIS EUUSA ROW
1 160889534 11,24
Credit Agricole Group  (FR) 15,60 1,75
JSC Sacam International  (FR) 12,40 1,39
Armenian regional farm unions (AM) 72,00 8,10
2 103238090 7,21
TDA Holdings Limited  (RU) 96,97 7,00
Ministry of Finance and Economy of RA-  (AM) 3,03 0,22
3 43466009 3,04
Flesh LTD  (AM) 74,10 2,25
EBRD ? 25,00
Resident Individuals (AM) 0,90 0,03
4 119481150 8,35
? 87,23
International Financial Corporation  ? 10,00
Resident Individuals (AM) 2,77 0,23
5 Gasprombank OJSC  39021943 2,73
Non-State Pension fund «Gazfond»(RU) 50,00 1,36
GAZPROM OJSC (RU) 41,73 1,14






















Ukrprombank LLC  (UA) 13,01 0,96
Christie Management Company(UA) 86,99 6,44
7 52186800 3,65
EBRD  ? 25,00
Resident Individuals (AM) 75,00 2,74
8 21571119 1,51
Resident Individuals (AM) 52,06 0,78
Non-resident Individuals  (US) 47,94 0,72
9 Vardan Sirmakes   (CH) 100,00 29711610 2,08 2,09
10 44688021 3,12
Vardan Sirmakes,Non-resident  (CH) 43,13 1,35
Hratch K. Gabrielyan, Non-resident  (US) 44,08 1,38
Non-resident Individuals  (CH) 5,10 0,16
(AM) 7,69 0,24
11 49019874 3,43
CreditBank S.A.L. (LB) 51,00 1,75
Physical persons (AM) 49,00 1,68
12 8442624 0,59
BTA Bank Kazakhstan 48,95
Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund (KZ) 75,10 0,22
EBRD, IFC,East capital   ?
ZRL Beteilingungs  (AT) 31,10 0,18












Byblos Bank S.A.L.  (LB) 65,00 0,80
EBRD  ? 25,00
10,00
14 T D A Holding Limited  (RU) 100,00 19068692 1,33 1,49
15 78655756 5,50
Advanced Global Investments LLC  (US) 95,00 5,22
The Armenian Saint Apostolic Church (AM) 5,00 0,27
16 135755820 9,49
HSBC Europe BV Group (NL) 70,00 6,64
Wings Establishment (LI) 30,00 2,85
17 48483671 3,39
Physical persons (AM) 76,50 2,59
(DE) 13,50 0,46
? 10,00
18 Iranian "Mellat" state banк (IR) 100,00 12464718 0,87 0,92
19 ProCredit Bank 16963647 1,19
ProCredit Holding  (DE) 68,40 0,81
EBRD  ? 16,67
KfW  (DE) 14,87 0,18
20 21518193 1,50
ZNGS-Prometey CJSC  (RU) 92,25 1,39
physical persons  (RU) 7,75 0,12
21 108782450 7,60
Ripatonso Holdings Limited ? 75,43
physical persons (RU) 24,57 1,87
Byblos Bank Armenia
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22 VTB OJSC  118953000 8,31
Non-resident Individuals  (RU) 87,62 7,28
Mellur limited(CY) 0,31 0,03
Tempelton russia and european fund inc (US) 0,23 0,02
Palgrave enterprises limited(CY) 0,12 0,01
Others ? 11,72
1 7589709 0,53
ACBA-CREDIT AGRICOLE BANK ?  (FR), (АМ) 54,00 0,21 0,08
CREDIT AGRICOLE LEASING  (FR) 38,00 0,20
Resident Individuals (АМ) 8,00 0,04
2 (AM) 291036 0,02 0,20
3 "ANIV"UCO LTD (AM) 505561 0,04 0,40
4 (USA) 100,00 11174124 0,78 0,79
5 Resident Individual (AM) 80,00 457576 0,03 0,03
6 Non Resident  (RU) 100,00 293249 0,02 0,02
7 Resident Individual (AM) 100,00 2618425 0,18 0,18
8 Bnakaran Eritasardnerin  (AM) 100,00
9 100,00 1068813 0,07 0,08
10 653631 0,05
11 Ecumenical Church  Armenian National ECLOF 817675 0,06 0,06
12 Express Credit 2128521 0,15
13 Fides  501059 0,04
14 Finca  Finca UCO CJSC 9410376 0,66
15 First Mortgage Company  UCO LLC (AM) 3018753 0,21 0,21
16 GARNI INVEST  UCO 100,00 1503372 0,11
VTB Bank (Armenia)
ACBA-Leasing
Agroleasing "AGROLIZING" UCO LTD
Aniv
Aregak
United Methodist Committee 




Bless Central Bank of Armenia - 
100%
CARD AgroCredit
Center for Agribusiness and 
Rural Development 
Credit Union






17 GFCUCO CJSC Resident Individuals (AM) 100,00 514094 0,04 0,04
18 GladzorUCO CJSC Resident Individuals (AM) 100,00 475993 0,03 0,03
19 MalatiaUCO LLC Resident Individuals (AM) 100,00 1926670 0,13 0,14
20 National Mortgage CompanyUCO CJSC Central Bank of Armenia  (AM) 100,00 7413622 0,52 0,52
19 Nor HorizonNor HorizonUCO LLC (AM) 100,00 1105677 0,08 0,08
20 NorvikUCO CJSC (EU) 100,00 15015313 1,05 1,06
21 PMZ NERDRUMNER 1918355 0,13
22 SEF International SEF InternationalUCO LLC 3343779 0,23
23 Unileasing UnileasingUCO CJSC 124570 0,01
Polygraph CJSC - 99% 99,00
Resident Individuals 1,00 0,00
24 VTB Leasing Credit Organization CJSC 167650 0,01
25 Resident Individual (USA) 100,00 947185 0,07 0,07
TOTAL OF BANKS' AND CO's ASSETS 1430943793 100,00
TOTAL OF BANKS' ASSETS 1355959005
TOTAL OF CO's ASSETS 74984788
ARM CIS EU USA ROW
TOTAL SHARES BY REGIONS  81,86 21,27 29,61 12,76 8,28 9,94
ADJUSTED TOTAL SHARES BY REGIONS  100,00 25,98 36,17 15,59 10,12 12,15
Norvik Bank (Latvia-Iceland 
bank)  PMZ NERDRUMNERUCO 
CJSC




Table 2:    Armenia Insurance Companies' Ownership Shares, by Region
No Shareholders (ISO Country Code) Market shares by regions, %
AM CIS EU USA ROW
1 517781 3,05
Stivens Invest & Finance S.A.  ?  50,00    
Norlin Assets  ?  50,00    
2 1922515 11,31
Cascade Capital Holdings   (US)  65,00     7,35
EBRD  ?  35,00    
3 1136370 6,68
Phisical person  (AM)  27,00     1,80
4 Ches-Tor Ltd.  (RU)  100,00     1223094 7,19 7,01
5 2105410 12,38
Invest-Polis Ltd. (Russia) (RU)  75,00     9,29
Levon Altunyan (Armenia)  (AM)  25,00     3,10
6 ―Mika Limited‖ Company (Great Britain)  (GB)  100,00     1802179 10,60 10,34
7 (GB)  100,00     1275783 7,50 7,32
8 Phisical persons (A) (AM)  100,00     1135381 6,68 6,51
9 1746168 10,27
Region CJSC (A) (AM)  94,83     9,74
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(RU)  50,00     3,35
 Polygraphiya CJSC  (RU)  50,00     3,35
11 ―ROSGOSSTRAKH‖ Ltd. 1838091 10,81
(RU)  49,00     5,30
(RU)  26,00     2,81
(RU)  25,00     2,70
12 1159079 6,82
Armeconombank ojsc (RoW)  20,00    
the Sukiasyan Family ( Armenia)  (AM)  80,00     5,45
17002113 100,00
AM CIS EU USA
Total shares by regions  86,98 27,13 33,81 17,66 7,35
Adjusted total shares by regions 100,00 31,20 38,88 20,30 8,45
Reso
CIS Equity Partners Limited 
LLC ,
Rosgosstrakh-Armenia
Depository Clearing Company CJSC 
(RUS)
Troyka Invest. limited liability 
company (RUS)






Table 3:    Armenia Telecommunications Sector Ownership Shares, by Region
Subscribers Mobile Market Share Market Share by Region %
Shareholders (ISO Country Code) Mobile Fixed AR CIS EU USA ROW
1 OJSC "VimpelCom" 100,00 34,96
Telenor  (NOR) 33,60 11,75
Alfa group (RUS) 37,00 12,93
Free float (Bank of New York)  (USA) 27,30 9,54
Treasury Stock  (RUS) 1,30 0,45
Other  (RUS) 0,80 0,28
2 2070000 59,31
Mobile TeleSystems (MTS) 80,00
AFK Sistema  (RUS) 52,8 25,05
(USA) 46,7 22,16
Others  (RUS) 0,5 0,24
(LB) 20,00 11,86
3Orange Armenia France Telecom (FR) 100,00 5,73 5,73
Total Subscribers (Fixed-line and Mobile) 100,00 ARM CIS EU USA ROW











Free float (traded on NY stock 
exchange) 
Investment group Fattouch 
Group
200 000





Table 4:    Armenia Air Transportation Sector Ownership Shares, by Region
NN Airlines Company Shareholders (ISO Country Code) Cargo carrying market share ARM CIS EU ROW
% %
1 (AM) 100 700 47,64 23,82 23,82
2 Resident Individuals (AM) 4,6 54,76 27,38 27,38
Domestic carriers  3,8 45,24 22,62
4 (AM) 85 19,23
ROW 15 3,39




Total carrying  8,4 1469,3
AR CIS EU ROW













―Air Armenia‖ CJSC  “Ararat International airlines” 
LLC ,“Air Highnesses” LLC  “Ark 
airways” LLC , “Atlantis European 
Airways” LLC, “Taron-Avia” LLC, 
“Vertir” LLC , etc.
“Ararat International airlines” LLC, 
“Taron-Avia” LLC
Aeroflot, S7 Airlines, Kavminvodyavia, 
Yamal Airlines, Rossiya Airlines, Ural 
Airlines, Polet Airlines, Saravia Saratov 
Airlines, Kuban Airlines, Tatarstan 
Airlines, Aeroflot-Don, Aerosvit 
Airlines, DonbassAero, Belavia, 
Dniproavia Air France, Austrian Airlines, bmi, 
Czech Airlines, LOT, airBaltic, 
Lufthansa, Virgin Atlantic, Air Italy
Syrian Air, Georgian Airways,  Flydubai93 
 
Table 5:    Armenia Pipeline Sector Ownership Shares, by Region
Market Share by Region %
Gas company Shareholders (ISO Country Code) AR CIS EU USA ROW
1 Armrosgazprom 100,00 100
Ministry of Energy of RA (AM) 20,00 20,00
Gazprom OSC 80,00
Russian government (RUS) 40,00 40,00
(EU) 2,00 2,00
Other registered entities  (RUS) 38,00 38,00
AR CIS EU USA ROW






Armenia  gas 
pipeline
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Appendix C : Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Goods 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities 
of substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua 
Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 countries. There were no Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) in their sample, but they did estimate elasticities for Lithuania. As a former Soviet 
Union country of about the same population as Armenia, we choose Lithuania as our proxy for 
Armenia. 
Broda et al., estimate 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors, but there is only one 
manufacturing sector in our model,  It was necessary to map the sectors estimated by Broda et 
al. into the sectors of our model. In table C1 of this appendix, we show the mapping for the 
imperfectly competitive sector. (These elasticities are not relevant in our model for perfectly 
competitive sectors.)  
Next, since there are multiple sectors from Broda et al. mapped into a single sector in 
our model, it was necessary to determine a method of weighting the Broda et al. elasticities. 
There are reasons to use both export shares as well as import shares. A larger share of a 
subcategory in imports reflects more imports, and more likely there are more varieties of 
imports. So weighting by the import share of a subcategory is better than an un-weighted 
measure.  Domestic varieties are also important.  Since we do not have production data for the 
subcategories, we use export shares as a proxy for domestic production by subcategory. 
Analogously, weighting subcategories by export shares is better than unweighted categories. 
Since both import shares and export shares are useful in the weighting, we take one half the 
shares of both exports and imports as the weights. We obtained the data for the import and 
export shares from the COMTRADE database. The resulting elasticities are reported in table C1. 
XXX   
  For the sensitivity analysis, we must take upper and lower bounds of the elasticities. 
Unfortunately, Broda et al. only report point estimates in their on-line Excel file. In the paper 
itself, however, Broda et al. (2006, table 4, p. 36) list the standard error of the median Dixit-
Stiglitz estimate for the country. The standard errors are rather small for most countries. In the 
case of Lithuania, the median Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity is 3.8 with a standard error (of the median 
estimate) of 0.23.  
Although we don’t have standard errors at the product line level, we use the overall 
estimate of the standard error to guide our choice of upper and lower values of the estimates. 
The low standard error suggests that we do not need to take very large ranges to check for 
robustness. For central values of  3.8 or less, we took plus or minus three times the average 
standard error of 0.23. CGE modelers have often doubled and halved the central estimate in the 
sensitivity. For central values greater than 3.8, we took plus or minus 50% of the value of the 
parameter, which gives a wider band than plus or minus three times the standard error. For 
these elasticities, this presents a tougher test of the robustness of our model. 
 
Broda, Christian , Joshua Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006), “From Groundnuts to 
Globalization: A Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth,” National Bureau of Economic 95 




Table C1: Estimated Elasticities of Substitution for Varieties in Tanzanian Imperfectly Competitive Goods Sectors
Sector in our Model Matching HS-3 Code from Broda et al estimates weighted elasticity of substitution
Processed food 110, 150, 151, 160, 170, 180 190, 200, 210 10
Beverages & tobacco products 220, 240 2
Textile & leather products 510-630, 650, 420 4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 280-391 3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 310 2
Petroleum refineries 271 4
Glass & cement 680-702 5
Iron steel & metal products 720-831 7
Mining & quarrying 270, 271 4
Grain milling 110 3
Source: Authors calculations based on estimates from Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006). 96 
Table C1: Estimated Elasticities of Substitution for Varieties in Tanzanian Imperfectly Competitive Goods Sectors
Sector in our Model Matching HS-3 Code from Broda et al estimates weighted elasticity of substitution
Processed food 110, 150, 151, 160, 170, 180 190, 200, 210 10
Beverages & tobacco products 220, 240 2
Textile & leather products 510-630, 650, 420 4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 280-391 3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 310 2
Petroleum refineries 271 4
Glass & cement 680-702 5
Iron steel & metal products 720-831 7
Mining & quarrying 270, 271 4
Grain milling 110 3




Appendix D: Border Costs 
Estimate of the impact of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the 
European Union on Armenian Border Costs  
For the estimate of Armenian border costs associated with exporting and importing we 
begin with the survey of border costs undertaken by Maliszewska et al., (2008) in late 2007.  
They report that import and export procedures are regarded by Armenian businessmen as one 
of the most corrupt areas of public administration. Customs procedures are riddled by rent 
seeking and corruption.  The results of their survey (see Maliszeswska et al., (2008, table 9.2) 
reveal that the average costs of exporting to the European Union are higher by 10.4 percent due 
to customs procedures. Although they report the results of their survey by sector, and in some 
sectors the reported costs are considerably higher.(as high as 60 percent), they argue that the 
size of the sample is too small to distinguish exporting costs by sector. We thus take the average 
costs of customs procedures of 10.4 percent as applying to all sectors in 2007, both for exports 
and imports. 
To update the estimate to 2010, we employ data from the Cost of Doing Business Survey 
of the World Bank.
32 According to the Doing Business Survey, in 2007, the cost of exporting a 
container from Armenia was $1600, but had risen to $1731 in 2010. Prices in Armenia have risen 
by 27 percent between 2007 and 2010 (January to September average).
33  Converting the $1731 
estimate for 2010 to 2007 prices, we estimate the cost of exporting a container from Armenia in 
2010 are $1365 in 2007 prices (which are $1731/1.27) This suggests that the costs of exporting a 
container in Armenia in 2010 are .854  times the costs in 2007 ($1365/1600). Finally, we 
estimate that the border costs of exporting to the EU from Armenia in 2010 are 8.9 percent 
(which is 10.4% * .854) of export revenues.  This means that for each dollar of revenue from 
export sales to the EU in 2010, Armenian exporters lose 8.9 cents to border costs. 
Similarly for imports, the cost of importing a container into Armenia was $1880 in 2007, 
but had risen to $2096 in 2010. Converting the $2096 estimate for 2010 to 2007 prices, we 
estimate the cost of importing a container into Armenia in 2010 are $1652 in 2007 prices (which 
are $2096/1.27) This suggests that the costs of exporting a container in Armenia in 2010 are .88 
($1652/1880) times the costs in 2007. We estimate that the border costs of importing from the 
EU to Armenia in 2010 are 9.1 percent (which is 10.4% * .88) of import revenues. 
Given the focus of the EU on institutional development for trade facilitation, a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU is likely to reduce these costs for exports to 
the EU. To estimate the extent of a reduction in these costs, we note that the border costs of 
exporting by the transition countries that are now members of the EU, again from the Doing 
Business survey. The border costs of exporting a container in 2010 are as follows: Bulgaria, 
$1551; Czech Republic, $1060; Estonia, $730; Hungary, $1225; Latvia, $600; Lithuania, $870; 
Poland, $884; Romania, $1275; Slovak Republic, $1445; and Slovenia, $1075.  All have lower 
border costs of exporting in 2010 than the $1731 of Armenia. But the border costs of exporting 
a container from Bulgaria suggests that EU membership is not a magic bullet for reducing the 
border costs of exporting down to the level of the Baltic countries. It appears reasonable, 
                                                           
32 For the raw Doing Business data see: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreTopics/trading-across-
borders. 
33 Price index data are taken from the website of the Armenian Statistical Office. See 
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however, that with institutional development for trade facilitation associated with a deep and 
comprehensive trade agreement with the EU, that Armenia could reduce its border costs of 
exporting to the 2010 costs of Ukraine ($1230) or Georgia ($1270).  We assume, therefore, that 
the impact of a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU would reduce the 
border costs of exporting to the EU to $1250 from $1731. That is, the costs will fall by 28 
percent of their present value.
34  Thus, in the scenario for a deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement with the EU, we assume that, due to cost reduction, exporters save 2.5 cents of each 
dollar of export revenue from sales to the EU (28 percent of 8.9 percent), and importers will 
save 2.5 cents on each dollar of import costs (28 percent of 9.1 percent).     
Improved institutional development for trade facilitation is likely to reduce trade 
facilitation costs for imports from and exports to all regions. If customs is more efficient in 
processing imports from the EU, these procedures will generally facilitate trade with all regions. 
For example, if trucks with imports from the EU can pass through Armenian borders more 
quickly, trucks with imports from other countries are also likely to see reduced delays. Given 
that the EU will monitor trade with the EU much more carefully, it is possible that not all 
institutional reforms in trade facilitation will transmit to trade with non-EU countries. So we 
shall assume that the border costs of exporting to or importing from non-EU countries will fall 
by 25 percent. Then, we assume that exporters save  2.2 cents of each dollar of export revenue 
from sales to the EU (25 percent of 8.9 percent), and importers will save 2.3 cents less on each 
dollar of import costs from non-EU countries (25 percent of 9.1 percent). 
We summarize these calculations in the table below.  
 
Border costs of trade in 2007 10.4
Border costs of exporting in 2010 8.9
Border costs of importing in 2010 9.1
Reduction in exporting border costs for EU trade 2.5
Reduction in exporting border costs for non-EU trade 2.2
Reduction in importing border costs for EU trade 2.5
Reduction in importing border costs for non-EU trade 2.3
Source: Authors' calculations based on sources described above. 
Summary of Estimates of the impact of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement with the European Union on Armenian Border Costs 




                                                           
34 Maliszewska et al., (2008) assume that a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement between 
Armenia and the EU would reduce Armenian border costs of exporting to the EU by 50 percent.   
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Appendix E: Impact of harmonization of Armenian standards with the 
European Union 
 
In order to assess the National Quality Infrastructure
35 of Armenia, the World Bank, in 
collaboration with the EU Advisory Group in Armenia and the Armenian-European Policy and 
Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC), conducted enterprise surveys and visited various National Quality 
Infrastructure institutions in October 2009 and February 2010.  Their study, World Bank (2010), 
shows that the National Quality Infrastructure is very poorly developed in Armenia, imposes 
significant costs on Armenian enterprises, and will have to be significantly improved to meet the 
requirements of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union. 
The study documents several problems. Among them are the following: 
(i)  Laboratories in Armenia have poorly trained personnel, poor equipment and produce results 
that are subject to much skepticism; only one-quarter are accredited. Armenian enterprises 
complain about a shortage of certification bodies and testing laboratories. The Armenian 
legislative requirement that certification bodies must have their own testing laboratories limits 
the development of certification facilities. This is not a requirement in the EU.  
(ii) There is no real industrial calibration system in place in Armenia.  
(iii) “Armenian certificates are not recognized abroad, including in Russia. This is one of the main 
obstacles for Armenian companies wishing to export. This is directly linked to the quasi-
nonexistence of internationally accredited certification bodies in Armenia, the lack of 
international recognition of the national accreditation system and the lack of international 
traceability in the national metrology system. Among the surveyed enterprises, the evaluation 
of NQI services varied from “very good” to “incompetent and corrupt”, but the majority 
expressed dissatisfaction with the NQI system.” World Bank (2010) 
(iv) “The mandatory nature of certain standards differs from the international practice of 
voluntary standards.’  This is a significant problem since mandatory requirements for products 
not subject to these requirements in export markets, limit that capacity to adapt to market 
needs in addition to imposing direct compliance costs. 
Although Maliszewska et al., (2008) conducted a survey of Armenian exporters, they 
were not able to obtain estimates of their costs of compliance with EU standards. In the case of 
Ukraine, however, such estimates are available based on the survey of 500 Ukrainian firms that 
export to the EU. Those results shown in Jakubiak et al., (2006), and we shall base our estimate 
for Armenia on the Ukrainian data, with an adjustment for Armenian circumstances that we 
discuss below. 
On average, the Ukrainian respondents reported that 13.9 percent of their production 
costs in the prior year were due to the costs of compliance with EU norms, regulations or 
product quality standards.  One of the more significant expenditures in this regard was testing 
                                                           
35 The term ―National Quality Infrastructure‖ denotes the complete public and private infrastructure 
required to establish and implement the standardization, metrology, inspection, testing, certification, and 
accreditation services needed to prove that products and services meet defined requirements, whether 
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and certification procedures, which they found amounted to 4.2 percent of production costs.   
Costs varied considerably across sectors, with, perhaps surprisingly, textile and apparel and 
mineral products being the two sectors where the cost of compliance with EU standards was the 
highest.  
Due to the problems mentioned above, we assume that the costs for Armenian 
exporters to meet EU standards are fifty percent higher than for Ukrainian exporters. 
Maliszewska et al., (2008) made the same assumption and publish their estimate by sector for 
Armenia in their table 9.4. Averaging the data in their table 9.4 to obtain the sectors in our 
model, we get the results in column 1 below. The EU devoted considerable resources to 
assisting it new member states with standards and, similarly and is allocating resources to this 
problem for the countries who may potentially have a DCFTA. Consequently, we assume these 
costs will fall as a result of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. We assume they 
will fall by 25 percent on exports to the EU.
36 These results are in column 2 of the table below.  
We must also take into account, however, that adaption to EU standards is costly. It 
costly for private firms since firms must purchase capital equipment to adapt production 
processes and train personnel to meet EU standards. It is also costly for the government to help 
develop the National Quality Infrastructure institutions. These costs may be high, but they are 
primarily one off costs of adjustment, unlike the permanent and repeated decrease in 
compliance costs once the adaption has been accomplished. Nonetheless, they mute the gains 
from adapting to EU standards for firms exporting to the EU. Since our model is a comparative 
static model, we assume that these one-time adaption costs are equivalent to a permanent 
increase in costs of two percent of production costs. In column 2, we ignore adaption costs and 
therefore exaggerate the reduction in compliance costs. Incorporating the adaption costs, yields 
that compliance costs would fall to the level shown in column 4 of the table below.   
  Some firms who do not export to the EU, may decide to start exporting if costs of 
exporting to the EU decline. Others may continue selling in only the domestic market or the CIS 
market where standards may remain different from EU standards. For firms who do not export 
to the EU, provided EU standards are not made mandatory for all firms, there should be no 
change in their costs of production as a result of the DCFTA. 
The bottom line estimate is that for Armenian firms exporting agricultural products to 
the EU, their costs of standards will fall by two percentage points of their costs, from 15.8 to 
13.8 percent of their production costs. For firms exporting manufactured products, their costs 
will fall by 3.2 percentage points, from 21.6 percent of their production costs to 18.2 percent of 
their production costs. Standards costs for firms exporting to the CIS or Rest of the World do not 
change.  
 These results are summarized in the table below.  
                                                           
36 Maliszewska et al., (2008) assumed a fifty percent cost reduction. Clearly there is 
considerable uncertainty in our estimate, but we believe fifty percent is an upper bound on the 
range of possible cost reductions,. A cost reduction of this magnitude would likely generate 
private demand for the National Quality Infrastructure, something that is not evident in 
Armenia.  
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  Cost of Compliance with EU standards*
as a percentage of annual production costs
1 2 3 4
pre- post- adjustment post-DCFTA costs
FTA DCTFA costs including adjustment
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 15.8 11.8 2 13.8
Mining 0.0 0.0 0 0.0
Manfacturing 21.6 16.2 2 18.2
*The change is costs of compliance for firms not exporting to the EU is zero. 
Source: Authors' estimates  
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Appendix G: Documentation of Input-Output table for Armenia 
Jesper Jensen and David G. Tarr 
Summary 
The core of the model data consists of an input-output table. There exists no recent 
input-output table for Armenia, so we produced the table based on data provided by the 
National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia. Lacking resources for a full survey, these 
data were obtained by the National Statistical Office by a pilot sample survey.  Our data sources 
include an unbalanced supply-use table with 16 sectors for the year 2006 and detailed data on 
GDP for 2007 by types of income, expenditure, and production. The supply-use table contains all 
the elements we need for the input-output table, but supply deviates significantly from use in 
most of the sectors. Accounting identities require that supply must equal use for a balanced 
input-output table and for a table that we can use in our model. The sheer size of the deviations 
in the supply-use table calls for funding a full survey by the National Statistical Office to obtain 
additional and more accurate detailed data to reduce the deviations.  
 Without access to more accurate and detailed data, we develop a balancing procedure 
to arrive at a balanced input-output table. The procedure involves an optimization problem in 
which the elements of the table are adjusted such that the sum of the squared deviations from 
the initial values are minimized and subject to a number of side constraints, including supply-use 
balance. As part of the procedure, we also use detailed GDP data to update the dataset to the 
year 2007. Finally, we disaggregate two services sectors to get more details on transport, 
communication and financials sectors. The final table contains 21 sectors.   
 
Introduction 
We begin with a dataset compiled by Light (2010), whose data sources include an 
unbalanced supply-use table with 16 sectors for the year 2006, and detailed data on GDP for 
2007. All data is provided by the National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia.  
Light (2010) documents a procedure to balance the data, and also shows how the data is 
used to implement a simple CGE model of Armenia. The balancing procedure is very simple, 
however, as the majority of adjustments are made to only two elements of the data: household 
consumption and compensation of employees. The large imbalances in the supply-use table 
translate into large adjustments in these two data elements. In turn, this implies large changes 
in GDP. 
We use an alternative balancing procedure which extends the procedure by Light (2010) 
in several ways. First, the procedure allocates adjustments to the entire dataset, and auxiliary 
data and information is used to guide the adjustments. Second, we explicitly account for GDP in 
the balancing procedure, so that GDP in the final data set is indeed close to official GDP. This 
applies to both total GDP and the components of GDP. 
The next section shows how we construct the initial estimate of our input-output table 
and reports the imbalances in the data set. The following section documents the procedure we 104 
use to balance the data and summarizes our results. The final section shows how we 
disaggregate two services sectors. 
 
Construction of the input-output table 
We follow Light (2010) and the structure of the supply-use table in the construction of 
the initial estimate of the input-output table. Figure 1 shows the structure of a typical input-
output table. There are three major matrices in the table: Value-added, intermediate use, and 
final demand.  
The supply-use table and the official GDP data are reported with details for 16 sectors. 
The intermediate use matrix thus has 16 rows and 16 columns. Correspondingly, the final 
demand matrix has 16 rows, and the value-added matrix has 16 columns. 
 























The value-added data in the supply-use table is taken directly from official GDP data for 
2006. We estimate the matrix with value-added data in our input-output table using the same 
type of data, but update to 2007.  105 
The official GDP data also contains data on total intermediate consumption by sector (a 
total for each column). To estimate our matrix of intermediate use, we combine these totals 
with the matrix of coefficients for intermediate use reported in the supply-use table. The 
coefficients sum to 100% for each sector (column), and thus allow us to allocate total 
intermediate consumption to individual sectors (rows). 
The supply-use table also has details on final demand and international trade. The totals 
in the table are again taken directly from official GDP data for 2006, and again we update to 
2007. To estimate our matrix of final demand, in which we also include both exports and 
imports, we combine these totals with the matrix of coefficients reported in the supply-use 
table. Thus, the sectoral structure of the final demand matrix in our input-output table 
corresponds to the structure of the supply-use table. 
This completes our estimate of the input-output table. Next we analyze the data. Our 
analysis of the data is mainly concerned with the supply-use balance. Supply consists of 
domestic production and imports. Use (or demand), consists intermediate use and final 
demand, including exports. In a final input-output table supply must equal demand.  
Table 1 shows supply-demand imbalances by sector. We report excess demand, that is 
demand less supply. In absolute terms, excess demand is biggest for manufacturing followed by 
agriculture and construction. In relative terms, excess demand is large for most sectors. Excess 
demand is more than 25% of total supply in 10 out of 14 sectors
37.  
The imbalances need to be resolved before using the data with a model. The following 
section develops a balancing procedure for this purpose. 
The size of the imbalances suggests significant problems in the data. This calls for 
additional data work before adjusting the data with a balancing procedure. Unfortunately, we 
could not obtain additional data to improve our initial estimate of the input-output table. 
Instead, we assess the quality of the different parts of the data, and collect data on the structure 
of input-output tables for similar countries. We use the quality assessment and the auxiliary 
data to guide the necessary adjustments. 
 
Balancing of the input-output table 
We now develop a balancing procedure that produces a balanced input-output table. All 
data points in the input-output table are included and may be adjusted.  
The heart of the procedure is an optimization problem that in which the elements of the 
table are adjusted such that an objective function is minimized subject to side constraints. The 
objective function is of the popular form which adds the sum of the squared deviations from the 
initial estimates
38. The side constraints include supply-use balance by sector, and a GDP 
accounting identity. The latter equates total GDP by measured by income with total GDP 
measured by expenditure. 
                                                           
37 We did a similar analysis using data from the supply-use table only (using 2006 data only and without 
updating to totals for 2007). The analysis revealed similar imbalances.  
38 All of the squared deviations are scaled by the corresponding size of the original estimate to preserve the 
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We adapt the procedure to account for our quality assessment of the data and for 
auxiliary data. We first review the quality of the data used to construct our initial estimate of the 
input-output table. To assess the quality, we evaluate whether we believe the data are 
representative of what they are supposed to report. That is, to what extent do we consider the 
underlying data complete and accurate? 
We distinguish three levels of quality: high, medium and low. The purpose is to have 
more adjustments in data of low quality and fewer adjustments in data of high quality. This is 
one way (albeit indirect) of correcting for problems in data. 
We begin with data of high quality. The first are data on imports and exports, which in 
turn are based on customs data. These data are typically collected with lots of detail and in a 
format consistent with input-output tables. The second are the data on total GDP. This data 
point can be and is calculated in several ways, and should be identical independently of the 
method used. This provides a check on the data. Moreover, GDP data is widely used and thus 
frequently reviewed. 
As data of medium quality we include industrial structure, measured as output by 
sector. These data are in part based on commodity balances and on wage data by sector, both 
of which are typically collected with lots of details. 
As data of low quality we include the structure of intermediate demand, and household, 
government, and investment expenditure. These data are to some extent based on surveys. In 
this sense they are less complete and must subsequently be scaled appropriately to become 
representative. Also, the surveys used are not always consistent with the classifications of the 
input-output table. 
We account for data quality in the objective function by assigning weights to the data 
elements depending on quality. High, medium and low quality data are assigned the weights of 
5, 3, and 1, respectively.  
This setup implies that a given adjustment in data carry different penalties depending 
on what data element is adjusted. For example, a given adjustment in imports carries a five 
times higher penalty in the objective function than an identical adjustment in intermediate 
demand. Obviously, this results in more and larger adjustments in data with low weights 
(quality) than in data with high weights (quality). This is exactly the purpose of the design. 
  This brings us to our second adaptation of our balancing procedure: the use of auxiliary 
data. The use of weights implies that most adjustments will take place in intermediate 
demand
39. Now, we want to avoid that intermediate demand is adjusted in an unrealistic way. 
To achieve this, we install lower and upper bounds based on GTAP data on the variables 
representing intermediate demand
40. 
Specifically, we aggregate version 7 of the GTAP database to the level of aggregation in 
the Armenian supply-use table. We then compute coefficients of intermediate demand by 
                                                           
39 Low weights also apply to several final demands, but they also make up GDP, which is assigned a high 
weight, and they are therefore less likely to change. Also, adjustments in intermediate demands may in 
some cases serve two purposes simultaneously: Reduce excess demand in one sector, and reduce excess 
supply in another sector. The reason is that intermediate demand is part of domestic supply. 
40 See Narayanan and Walmsley (2008) for documentation of the GTAP data. 107 
sector for the following countries: Albania; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Belarus; Czech Republic; 
Estonia; Croatia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Lithuania; Latvia; Poland; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Slovakia; Slovenia; and Ukraine.  
For each cell in the matrix with intermediate coefficients in the Armenian data we apply 
the GTAP coefficients to the corresponding variable. The lower (upper) bound is set equal to the 
minimum (maximum) of the values calculated for the countries listed above. That is, for each 
input-output coefficient, we constrain the rebalancing procedure such that each coefficient in 
the balanced Armenian table we create lies within the observed bounds of the coefficients of 
the 19 Transition countries we consider.  
 
Results 
Table 1 reports calculations based on the supply-use table provided by the National 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia. In each sector, as an accounting identity, we must 
have that domestic production plus imports (total supply) is equal to domestic consumption (for 
intermediate and final use) plus exports (total demand). The excess demand columns show the 
extent that total demand exceeds or is less than total supply (both in Armenian DRAM and as a 
percentage of total supply). Excess demand in the original data varies from +75% in the case of 
electricity to -48% in the case of mining. These percentages show very large inaccuracies in the 
data at the sector level, and must be corrected to have a correct input-output table or a table 
that can be used in our model.  
“Official” estimates of total GDP are available on the website of the National Statistical 
Office of the Republic of Armenia. We compare the official estimate with the supply-use table 
and our balanced table in Table 2.For the supply-use table, the imbalance is below and beyond 
official GDP depending on the method used. GDP in our balanced table is less than 1% off official 
GDP, and consistent across methods.  
The adjustments in the components that make up GDP are slightly larger (see Tables 3 
and 4). The largest change is reported for household expenditure. The main reason is that the 
official data for the large manufacturing sector report 50 percent more use than is available 
from production and imports. To attain consistency, a large decrease in consumption of 
manufactured goods is required; this accounts for about half of total consumption. Similarly, our 
optimized balancing routine results in an increase in imports of manufacturing goods as a 
percentage of total imports; this is required in order to balance the officially reported excess 
demand for manufactured goods (see Table 5).  
Disaggregation of the input-output table 
Two sectors in the input-output table, “Transport, storage and communications” and 
“Financial intermediation”, account for most business services in Armenia. Given our focus on 
these services in the model, these sectors are disaggregated into 9 sectors using two data 
sources.  
For “Transport, storage and communications” we obtained unpublished national 
accounts data for the year 2007 from the National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia. 
Table 7 shows the data.  108 
Within the aggregate sector in the input-output table, the share of gross domestic 
product by disaggregate sector is used to decompose the aggregate sector. It is furthermore 
assumed that the input output structure for all the disaggregate sectors is identical to the input 
output structure of the corresponding aggregate sector. 
For “Financial intermediation”, comparable national accounts data is not available. The 
two major sub-sectors are banking and insurance services. To obtain data on the share of the 
two sub-sectors, we collected data for the year 2007 on assets in the sub-sectors from the 
Central Bank of Armenia website. Table 8 shows the data. The share data is used to disaggregate 
the aggregate sector “Financial intermediation” as explained above. 
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Excess Demand  
(% of total supply)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 667674 946682 -279008 -29
Mining and quarrying 140383 265814 -125431 -47
Manufacturing 2628702 1696509 932192 55
Electricity, gas and water supply 309011 167184 141827 85
Construction 1199096 1349184 -150089 -11
Wholesale and retail trade and repair 462281 511197 -48917 -10
Hotels and restaurants 103346 138806 -35460 -26
Transport, storage and communications 328311 436416 -108105 -25
Financial intermediation 69604 109189 -39585 -36
Real estate and professional services 95704 175056 -79352 -45
Public administration and defence 176585 162771 13814 8
Education 203286 120656 82631 68
Health and social work 157127 129786 27341 21
Other social and personal services 29630 84707 -55077 -65
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia  
 
 








Income 3149283 2860584 3044640
Expenditure 3149283 3137365 3044640
Production 3149283 2906200 3044640
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia  
 
 












Supply-Use Table 3137365 72 10 38 -20
Authors' balanced table 3044640 67 10 42 -19
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia  
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Table 4. Composition of GDP by income category, 2007 
Total
(Millon Dram)











Supply-Use Table 2860584 42 55 2 1
Authors' balanced table 3044640 43 55 1 1
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia  
 






Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 4 4
Mining and quarrying 12 6
Manufacturing 67 75
Electricity, gas and water supply 0 0
Construction 0 0
Wholesale and retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 2 1
Transport, storage and communications 10 9
Financial intermediation 1 1
Real estate and professional services 1 1
Public administration and defence 1 1
Education 1 1
Health and social work 0 0
Other social and personal services 0 0
Total 100 100
Total (million Dram) 1147289 1102425
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National Statistical Office 
of the Republic of Armenia  
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Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1 1
Mining and quarrying 8 10
Manufacturing 68 66
Electricity, gas and water supply 1 1
Construction 1 1
Wholesale and retail trade and repair
Hotels and restaurants 1 1
Transport, storage and communications 10 10
Financial intermediation 1 2
Real estate and professional services 4 4
Public administration and defence 1 1
Education 2 2
Health and social work 1 1
Other social and personal services 0 1
Total 100 100
Total (million Dram) 518529 528637
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from National Statistical Office 
of the Republic of Armenia  
 
Table 7. GDP by sub-sector, 2007 
 
Sector Share (%)
Transport, storage and communication 100.0
Transport via railways 5.9
Other land transport 17.8
Transport via pipelines 3.6
Air transport 20.7
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 7.0
Post and courier activities 0.5
Telecommunications 44.4
Source: National Statistical Office of the Republic of Armenia  
 
Table 8. Assets by sub-sector, 2007 
 
Sector Million AMD Share (%)
Financial intermediation 1372961 100.0
Banking 1355959 98.8
Insurance 17002 1.2
Source: Central Bank of Armenia  112 
Appendix H:  Empirical literature summary on the role of trade and FDI in increasing total 
factor productivity through technology transfer as a function of research and development 
intensity  of  the  trading  partner,  and  implications  for  parameter  choices  in  regional  trade 
policy models 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) have developed models of economic growth that have 
highlighted the role of trade in a greater variety of intermediate goods as a vehicle for 
technological spillovers that allow less developed countries to close the technological gap with 
industrialized countries.  Similarly, Romer (1994) has argued that product variety is a crucial and 
often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is the 
greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there 
are other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.
41 Consequently, 
we take variety as a metaphor for the various ways increased trade can increase productivity. 
Winters et al. (2004) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that “the recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on 
productivity and its rate of change.” Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the 
following. Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 
1.2 percent per year in the “true” import price index. Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott 
(2004) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between 
nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of exports in a sector increases total 
factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and Korea, and they have 
some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. In business 
services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a diverse set 
of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. The evidence for 
this was cited in the introduction section. 
Beginning with the path-breaking work of Coe and Helpman (1995), a rich literature now 
exists that has empirically investigated the transmission of knowledge through the purchase of 
imported intermediate goods and through foreign direct investment.  Coe and Helpman found 
that OECD countries benefit from foreign research and development (R&D), that they benefit 
more from trading with countries that have a larger stock of research and development, and 
that the benefits are greater the more open the country is to foreign trade.  Moreover, while in 
large countries the elasticity of total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to domestic R&D 
capital stocks is larger than that with respect to foreign R&D capital stocks, the opposite holds in 
small countries; that is, foreign R&D is more important for small countries.  Coe, Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (1997) extend these results based on a sample of 77 developing countries. They find 
developing countries that do little R&D on their own, have benefited substantially from 
industrialized country R&D through trade in intermediate products and capital equipment with 
industrialized countries. They find that R&D spillovers through trade with the U.S. are the 
largest, since the U.S. stock of R&D is the highest and it is the most important trading partner for 
many developing countries. A one percent increase in the R&D stock of the U.S. raises total 
factor productivity for all 77 developing countries in their sample by 0.03 percent. By 
                                                           
41 Trade or services liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive 
impact on the development of institutions (see Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004).  
It may also induce firms to move down their average cost curves, or import higher quality 
products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry.  Tybout and 
Westbrook (1995) find evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican 
manufacturing firms. 113 
comparison, a one percent increase in the R&D stock of Japan, Germany, France or the U.K. 
raises total factor productivity only between 0.004 percent and 0.008 percent. Crucially, they 
find that countries that trade more with the U.S., such as the Latin American countries, get more 
productivity spillover increases from the U.S. R&D stocks. And the relatively more open East 
Asian countries have benefited the most from foreign R&D through trade.  Keller (2000) also 
finds that trade is an important conveyor of R&D and is especially important for small countries.  
Several other studies, including Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005), Schiff et al., (2002)  and Falvey et 
al., (2002), confirm these results. Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005) show that technological spillovers 
can occur from indirect trade with technologically advanced countries. i.e., imports from the 
U.K. embody some U.S. technology due to U.K. imports from the U.S.. Since the data show that 
OECD countries have the vast majority of R&D stocks,
42 it implies that it is important for small 
developing countries to trade with large technologically rich countries, such as the U.S. and the 
EU, at least indirectly. 
Regarding the impact of FDI on the productivity of firms, the results depend on intra-
industry versus inter-industry impacts. Since FDI in the same industry may bring spillovers, but 
has an adverse competitive or market share impact, the literature has found mixed results on 
the productivity of firms in the same industry that receives the FDI.  But several papers have 
found significant productivity spillovers from FDI in both upstream (supplying) industries (e.g., 
Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; and Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) and downstream 
(using) industries (e.g., Wang, forthcoming; Jabbour and Mucchielli, 2007; and Harris and 
Robinson, 2004).  Saggi (2006) summarizes the theory and additional empirical papers that show 
the spillovers of FDI on supplying industries.  Regarding FDI in services, Arnold, Mattoo and 
Javorcik (2007) show that in the Czech Republic, services sector liberalization led to increased 
productivity of downstream industries, and the key channel through which reform led to 
increased productivity was allowing foreign entry.  Fernandes and Paunov (2008) found a 
positive and significant effect of foreign direct investment in services on productivity growth in 
Chile.  Fernandes (2007) finds a positive and significant effect of services liberalization in both 
finance and infrastructure on the productivity of downstream manufacturing in the fifteen 
Eastern European countries.  
Schiff and Wang (2006) estimate the relative importance for technology diffusion to 
developing countries of trade with industrialized versus developing countries. They note that 
technology from the industrialized countries may indirectly diffuse to a developing country 
through trade with another developing country, if the other developing country has traded with 
industrialized countries. They conclude that trade with industrialized countries has a stronger 
impact on productivity in developing countries and that spillovers from developing country 
trade occurs with more of a lag. They find that the elasticity of productivity (TFP) with respect to 
current trade with all industrialized countries is 0.16, but only 0.01 for current trade with all 
developing countries. That is, trade with the industrialized countries in 16 times better for 
productivity spillovers. In addition, since trade may be expected to have an impact on 
productivity with a lag, Schiff and Wang estimate the impact of lagged trade with developing 
countries. They find that the productivity spillovers from current trade with industrialized 
countries are only about 1.5 times greater than the productivity spillovers from lagged trade 
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with developing countries.
43 Moreover, Schiff et al. (2002) show that developing country trade 
with technologically advanced countries is very important in technology intensive sectors, but 
trade with developing countries can be important for productivity spillovers in less 
technologically complex products in which developing countries have comparative advantage. 
So on low R&D products like footwear and textiles and apparel, trade with China and Indonesia 
could be as important for technology diffusion as trade with the EU and the US.  
In summary, this literature shows that the purchase of intermediate inputs and FDI from 
industrialized countries is an important mechanism for the transmission of R&D and productivity 
growth in developing countries. For small developing countries, trading with large 
technologically advanced countries is crucial for TFP growth.  But for products in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage, developing country trade may be 
important for spillovers.  
In our model, the parameter that reflects the ability of a region to increase total factor 
productivity through the transmission of new technologies is the elasticity of varieties with 
respect to the price.  Schiff et al., (2002, table 1) have shown that for R&D intensive sectors, 
trade with industrialized countries contributes significantly to total factor productivity in 
developing countries, but trade with developing countries does not. Averaging over the 
industries in Schiff et al.,( 2002, table 3) yields that trade with industrialized countries in R&D 
intensive products is about eight times more valuable for developing country TFP increases.  On 
the other hand, for sectors that are low in R&D intensity, their results suggest that for 
technology diffusion trade with developing countries can be as important as trade with 
industrialized countries.  
Based on these considerations, we first classify the increasing returns to scale sectors of 
our model into low, medium and high technology sectors. The classification is defined by the 
share of R&D expenditures in total sales, based on U.S. data.  For low R&D intensive sectors, we 
assume that the elasticity of firms with respect to price is the same for the CIS region as for the 
EU, but the elasticity is only one-third of Rest of the World elasticity (trade with the CIS or EU 
regions misses out on trade with China or the U.S.). For medium and high R&D intensive sectors, 
we assume that trade and FDI with the CIS region is only one-eigth as valuable as trade with the 
Rest of the World (as discussed above), while trade with the EU is two-thirds as valuable as 
trade with the Rest of the World. Finally, we allow the elasticity of the Rest of the World to vary 
depending on the R&D intensity of the sector, where we allow for more technology diffusion in 
more R&D intensive sectors. The results of these assumptions are in table 6b.  
                                                           
43 Schiff and Wang do not compare lagged industrialized trade to lagged developing 
country trade, which may bias the results against the relative benefits of industrialized 
trade. 
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Appendix I: Comparison of the CASE study of the impact on Armenia of the Deep and 
Comprehensive Agreement between Armenia and the European Union with the present study 
 
Maliszewska et al. (2008) (hereafter the CASE study) estimated the impacts on Armenia 
of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU. As we do in the 
present study, they estimate four likely impacts of the DCFTA for Armenia: (i) reduced border 
costs; (ii) standards harmonization; (iii) commitments in the services sectors;  and (iv) 
improvements in the investment climate. The CASE study estimates that gains from the first 
three components will be 3.4 percent (this is the comparative static DCFTA scenario). When the 
improvement in the investment climate is added to the first three, the gains are an estimated 
8.0 percent of GDP (this is the comparative steady state DCFTA scenario). The estimates of the 
CASE study are considerably higher than the comparable estimates of this study: we estimate 
that the gains from the first three components will be 1.4 percent. When the improvement in 
the investment climate is added to the first three, our estimated gains increase to 1.6 percent.
44  
In this appendix we explain the reason for the differences in the estimates. They are due 
to a combination of two effects: (i) larger assumed distortions in the CASE study;  and (ii) 
different modeling assumptions. In all cases, the assumptions of the CASE study lead to larger 
estimated gains. The CASE study systematically assumes larger distortions are present in the 
Armenia than we assume in the present study.  The larger the distortions are, the more gains 
there are from their removal.  The larger distortions in the CASE study partly reflect the fact that 
our study was based on estimates of distortions in 2010, while the CASE study uses estimates of 
distortions from 2006 or 2007. Since Armenia has implemented substantial reforms in the 
interim, the initial distortions in the CASE study are significantly higher. This is the case with 
border costs. But it is also due, in some cases, to the fact that we had greater data available to 
us that allowed a more accurate estimate, for example in the services survey and estimates that 
we conducted. Further, there is a key modeling assumption difference in the assumption of 
which countries benefit from preferential liberalization of services that results in larger 
estimated gains in the CASE study, and a further modeling assumption difference in the 
comparative steady state scenario.  
 
I.  Comparative Static Estimates 
 
(i)  Barriers in Services. 
 The estimated gains of the CASE team from services commitments as part of 
a DCFTA should be substantially greater than the estimates in the present 
study for two reasons. First, the CASE team assumed that the barriers to 
foreign direct investors in services are much higher than we have estimated.  
Second, while our study assumed that commitments to foreign services 
suppliers under the DCFTA will be limited to EU suppliers, the CASE team 
assumed that the commitments under the DCFTA  will be provided to all 
foreign suppliers  (Maliszewska et al., 2008, p.154).  We elaborate on each of 
these two aspects. 
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As elaborated in Modebaze and Eroyants, our estimates of the ad valorem 
equivalents of the barriers against foreign direct investment in Armenian 
services sectors is based on a survey of the regulatory barriers in services in 
Armenia. As listed in table 4, our estimates are as follows: banking, 5.6 
percent;  insurance, 15.8 percent; pipeline transportation, 0 percent; rail 
transportation, 0 percent; air transportation, 106.8 percent; and 
telecommunications, 0.3 percent. The CASE team did not conduct a survey of 
the barriers in Armenia. Rather they assumed that the barriers in Armenia are 
25 percent lower than in Ukraine. The estimates for Ukraine were done by the 
Institute for Economic Research with guidance from Jesper Jensen, and were 
done using the same methodology as ours in Armenia.  The resulting 
estimates by CASE of the ad valorem equivalents of the barriers against 
foreign direct investment in Armenian services sectors were considerably 
higher than the present study, with the exception of air transportation. The 
CASE study estimates are as follows: banking and insurance, 18 percent; 
transportation, 12 percent; and telecommunications, 4.5 percent.  
 
Regarding the second issue, the CASE study assumed that commitments to 
foreign investors in services as part of a DCFTA with the EU will be extended 
to all services suppliers, i.e., that the preferential commitments will become 
multilateral. The assumption that the commitments will be multilateral implies 
substantially larger estimated gains for two reasons. First, the cost reduction 
from foreign suppliers is for all FDI, not just the EU share. Second, in our 
framework, since commitments are preferential, the gains from liberalizing 
with the EU come at a cost of some lost varieties of services from foreign 
suppliers.  We have shown that there is an imperfect competition analogy in 
preferential liberalization of services to the trade diversion issue in goods. By 
assuming all commitments are multilateral, there is no trade diversion. 
  
(ii) Border costs.  
 The CASE study assumes that border costs amounted to 10.6 percent of the 
value of imports and exports, and that these costs would fall by 50 percent as a 
result of the DCFTA (see pages 149-150). The CASE study was conducted 
based on 2007 data. Although we are close to CASE in the estimate of the 
border costs in 2007, the Costs of Doing Business data shows that border costs 
have fallen in Armenia between 2007 and 2010. We estimate that border costs 
are only 8.9 percent of the costs of importing and exporting in 2010. 
Moreover, no rationale is provided for the assumption of a fifty percent cut in 
border costs. We assume that border costs of land-locked Armenia will not 
fall below those of Georgia and Ukraine, who have ports. Based on these 
assumptions we estimate that border costs will fall between 2.2 percentage 
points and 2.5 percentage points, depending on destination country and 
imports or exports. This compares with the larger assumed cut by the CASE 
study of 5.3 percentage points. Had we assumed the same cut in border costs 117 
as in the CASE study, we would obtain more than one percent additional 
welfare gain as a percent of GDP. 
  
(iii) Standards costs. 
 Due to the lack of a survey for Armenia, both the CASE study and our study 
start with data for Ukraine (Jakubiak et al., 2006). The Ukrainian survey 
revealed that, on average for agriculture, mining and manufacturing,  the cost 
of compliance with EU standards and regulations was 13.9 percent of 
production costs. Due to the extremely poor status of the National Quality 
Infrastructure in Armenia, both the CASE authors and our study assume that 
these costs are higher in Armenia than in Ukraine by 50 percent (or 20.9 
percent of production costs on average). The CASE study assumes that 
Armenian production costs on exports to the EU will fall by 50 percent as a 
result of a DCFTA with the EU. Our estimates are smaller for two reasons. 
First, although the EU is likely to assist in the development of the National 
Quality Infrastructure, it is not likely to invest as heavily as it did in the 
countries involved in the Eastern Expansion of the EU. Consequently, we 
assume only a 25 percent decline in production costs. Second, it is necessary 
for Armenians to invest in the National Quality Infrastructure to be able 
achieve harmonization. We further limit the production costs cuts by two 
percentage points in agriculture and manufacturing to reflect the adjustment 
costs. In summary, we estimate that production costs of exports to the EU will 
fall, on average, from 20.9 percent of costs to 17.7 percent, whereas CASE 
assumes that they will fall from 20.9 percent of costs to 10.5 percent of the 
costs of exporting to the EU. 
 
II. Comparative Steady State Estimates--Improvement in the investment 
climate 
 
The CASE study simulates improvement in the long run investment climate 
from the DCFTA in a scenario (called deep FTA+). This is the scenario that gives the 
CASE study the large 8.0 percent estimated gains—otherwise gains are a maximum 
of 3.4 percent of GDP.  The CASE study employs a modeling approach first 
introduced into international trade analysis by Glenn Harrison, Thomas Rutherford 
and David Tarr for analysis of the impact of the EU single market  (Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr, 1996) and the Uruguay Round (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 
1997).  Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr have made their software publicly available 
and the CASE study uses it and acknowledges the source.
45 The present study uses 
the same modeling approach for its long run scenario to assess improvements in the 
investment climate. The CASE study gets a much larger gain in the long run than the 
present study. The reasons are two-fold: (i) with this methodology, the larger gains 
in the comparative static scenario of the CASE study are compounded and magnified 
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in the long run steady state scenario; and (ii) the CASE study assumes an exogenous 
reduction in the price of capital in the long run that generates considerable 
additional gains.  The technical explanation is as follows. 
In the comparative static scenario, the capital stock is fixed and the rental 
rate on capital is allowed to adjust. In the “steady state” scenario, the capital stock 
is allowed to adjust to maintain a constant real rate of return to capital, where the 
real rate of return to capital depends on the price of new capital relative to the 
rental rate on capital.  We assume the capital stock was in equilibrium initially, so 
when the rental rate of capital increases in the comparative static scenario, it 
becomes profitable to invest in capital. The capital stock will have to increase in the 
steady state until the marginal productivity of capital falls enough to bring the real 
return on capital investments back into equilibrium. Since the CASE study finds 
larger gains in the comparative static scenario, there is a larger increase in the rental 
rate on capital, which induces a larger increase in the capital stock in the steady 
state scenario.  In addition and importantly, the CASE study exogenously reduces 
the price of new capital, which further boosts the expansion of the capital stock. 
Drawing on wording in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996), the CASE 
authors acknowledge that the result should be discounted due to the failure of the 
steady state scenario to adjust for forgone consumption to get to a higher capital 
stock. That is, the gains are an upper bound estimate within the context of this 
model.
46  But the upper bound estimate of the CASE study is larger than that of the 
present study due to the magnification effect on the welfare gains of the larger 
increase in the rental rate on capital in the comparative static scenario and the fact 
that the CASE study exogenously reduced the price of new capital to further boost 
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